OPPORTUNITY DENIED

How HUD’s Note Sale Program Deprives Homeowners of the Basic Benefits of Their Government-Insured Loans

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**REPORT HIGHLIGHTS** ........................................................................................................... 1

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** ..................................................................................................... 2

**I. FOR DECADES, HUD'S FHA PROGRAM HAS PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP** ................................................................. 7

**II. BACKGROUND ON THE DISTRESSED ASSET STABILIZATION PROGRAM (DASP)** .................................................................................................................. 10
   A. HUD’s Launch of the DASP Program ............................................................................ 10
   B. Foreclosure Mediation Programs Reveal DASP’s Impact on Enforcement of FHA Loss Mitigation Guidelines ................................................................. 12

**III. DASP’S PRIMARY ROLE IS TO MANAGE SERVICERS’ FORECLOSURE DELAYS** .............................................................................................................. 18
   A. HUD Failed to Stop Servicer Delays and Then Responded with DASP ........... 18
   B. HUD’s Requirements for Processing Foreclosures Are Sidestepped by Servicers Selling Loans Into DASP ................................................................. 18
   C. Servicers Delayed Foreclosures in Key States after Their Systematic Mishandling of Foreclosure Proceedings Was Exposed ........................................... 21
   D. HUD Recognized the Need to Protect the FHA Insurance Fund from the Impact of Servicers’ Foreclosure Delays ............................................................... 24
   E. DASP Responded to the Foreclosure Delays .............................................................. 26
   F. DASP Undermined HUD’s Helpful Revisions to its Loss Mitigation Guidelines ... 27
   G. HUD’s Troubling Shift to Payment of Insurance Claims Without Foreclosure ........ 28
   H. What Might Have Been: HUD’s Missed Opportunity to Apply its Improved Loss Mitigation Program to the Backlog of Foreclosure Crisis Cases .................. 29
   I. HUD’s Loan Sale Program During the 1990s Showed that HUD Can Set Standards for Distressed Loan Buyers ................................................................. 31

**IV. ASSESSING DASP’S IMPACT ON HOMEOWNERS** ..................................................... 32
   A. The Evidence Does Not Show that DASP Helps Homeowners ......................... 32
   B. The Changes to DASP HUD Announced in 2015 Contain No Specific Resolutions to Long-Standing Problems with the Program ........................................... 35
   C. Most FHA Loans Are Sold By the Servicers Who Caused Major Foreclosure Delays ........................................................................................................... 36
   D. Most DASP Purchasers Are Private Equity Firms and Hedge Funds .............. 37
V. RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................... 39
   1. Enhance Loss Mitigation Compliance. ................................. 39
   2. Improve Buyer Oversight. ................................................ 40

VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................. 42

ENDNOTES .......................................................... 44

GRAPHICS

   Table 1 ............................................................................. 14
   FHA Distressed Asset Stabilization Program Cases in the Philadelphia
   Mediation Program (June–October 2014)

   Table 2 ............................................................................. 19
   FHA Foreclosure Time Frames in Ten Judicial Foreclosure States with
   Longest Foreclosure Time (by Months)

   Table 3 ............................................................................. 20
   FHA Foreclosure Time Frames in Ten Non-Judicial Foreclosure States with
   Shortest Foreclosure Time (by Months)

   Chart 1 ............................................................................. 22
   Annual Percentage Change in Scheduled Foreclosure Auctions
   (as of October 2014)

   Chart 2 ............................................................................. 37
   Top 10 Loan Buyers of FHA Defaulted DASP Loans
REPORT HIGHLIGHTS

1. **HUD’s loan sale program, the Distressed Asset Stabilization Program (DASP), has had a major negative impact on vulnerable homeowners and on federal housing funds.** DASP is the largest auctioning off of government-insured single family mortgage loans in the nation’s history. To date, under DASP, HUD has sold over 105,000 FHA-insured home loans valued at $17 billion, and the private firms that bought most of the loans acquired them at a significant discount. FHA-insured mortgages represent the last recourse for middle and lower income American families, and particularly families of color, who seek to achieve homeownership at reasonable terms.

2. **A few large mortgage servicers caused the problem that DASP was created to fix.** HUD started DASP when the FHA insurance fund faced unprecedented budgetary challenges. A few large mortgage servicers, including Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan Chase, deliberately delayed foreclosures of FHA-insured mortgages. HUD needed to cut further losses and decided to sell off the loans rather than wait for servicers to complete the foreclosures.

3. **HUD has not held the servicers accountable for the problems they caused.** Even though the servicers’ delays of foreclosure violated HUD timelines, HUD paid off the servicers’ insurance claims when they offered their loans for DASP sales. HUD paid off claims of servicers who had not followed HUD’s rules that require completion of loss mitigation reviews for homeowners before foreclosures.

4. **HUD failed to pursue other options for preserving the financial integrity of the FHA insurance fund, including making its servicers follow FHA’s loss mitigation rules.** Vigorous enforcement of HUD’s loss mitigation requirements for servicers would have allowed homeowners to reinstate loans to performing status. Effective use of FHA’s loss mitigation tools reduces losses to the insurance fund and preserves homeownership.

5. **DASP undercuts state foreclosure laws that help preserve homeownership and further HUD’s housing goals.** Many state foreclosure laws require that the servicer establish valid authority to foreclose and consider homeowners for alternatives to foreclosure. DASP has allowed servicers to remove cases from the state law foreclosure process instead of complying with these laws.

6. **HUD has systematically excluded the affected homeowners from any role in the DASP loan sale process.** Homeowners who are directly affected by mortgage servicers’ practices are in the best position to inform HUD that the servicers are not complying with HUD’s rules. HUD has repeatedly rejected demands that it require notices to homeowners before their loans are sold through DASP.

7. **DASP has not helped homeowners in any significant way.** HUD’s initial claims that DASP would help homeowners by allowing the buyers of the loans to offer generous loan modifications has not been substantiated by any evidence.

8. **HUD’s reliance on financial speculators to generate quick cash has not furthered the policy goals of the FHA program.** Private equity funds and hedge funds are the primary buyers of defaulted FHA loans. These speculators’ interest is to maximize profits upon resale of the loans they buy. They do not act to further the goals of preserving homeownership for middle-class Americans, a goal that Congress directed HUD to achieve. HUD has not implemented effective measures to ensure that these buyers further national housing policy goals.
To date, under DASP, HUD has sold off mortgage loans with unpaid principal balances totaling over $17 billion.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s) program for selling defaulted Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans is the largest auctioning off of government-insured home mortgage loans in the nation’s history, and it directly impacts low- and moderate-income homeowners. As a result of this series of auctions, known as the Distressed Asset Stabilization Program (DASP), many homeowners have lost the government backing of their loans, along with a wide array of tools that provide help in times of financial stress. To date, under DASP, HUD has sold off mortgage loans with unpaid principal balances totaling over $17 billion. While HUD has justified the sales as being a win-win for homeowners and its own insurance fund, the reality is that, in many cases, loans sold through the sales would have fared better and cost the insurance fund less if basic FHA rules were applied to address the defaults and loan sales were avoided. What’s more, the DASP sales have provided financial benefits to the same servicers (many of them large banks) who sidestepped FHA’s rules, absolving them of any responsibility for the servicing problems they created. Instead, HUD allowed the loans to be used as a source of profit.

DASP’s launch coincided with HUD’s improvements to its loss mitigation options for homeowners facing financial hardship. Because many loans were processed through DASP without completion of FHA’s loss mitigation review requirements, DASP undermined HUD’s own home retention guidelines. Many homeowners who have sought loan modifications after their loans were sold have found that the speculators who bought the loans offered few to no affordable options. A more balanced approach of enforcing the FHA loss mitigation rules and resorting to loan sales only after the options under the rules are exhausted would yield better outcomes for homeowners, communities, taxpayers, and the FHA program.

National Consumer Law Center’s (NCLC) review of cases during a short time period in 2014 found a pattern of homeowners having their loans sold through DASP even though they were in the process of working with a major FHA servicer, Bank of America, to obtain loss mitigation reviews. In fact, 23 Philadelphia homeowners with FHA-insured loans serviced by Bank of America were appearing for court-supervised settlement conferences when their loans were sold; several of the homeowners had met numerous times with the bank’s representatives, some of them for five, six, or even as many as nine conference sessions. Neither Bank of America nor HUD informed the homeowners that their loans were going to be sold or that their protections under FHA rules would no longer be recognized. The homeowners discovered the facts only after the sales took place. The DASP sales happened while Bank of America’s representatives were continuing to request information and process forms for FHA loss mitigation options. None of the homeowners received a final decision as to whether they qualified for FHA loss mitigation assistance. None of them ever received an FHA loss mitigation option.

Through the FHA Single-Family Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (the Fund), HUD insures private mortgage lenders against losses in order to encourage the lenders to make loans to low and moderate income households. HUD operates the Fund with a mandate from
Congress “to meet the housing needs of the borrowers that the single family mortgage insurance program under this subchapter is designed to serve.” In exchange for the insurance, FHA-insured lenders must satisfy specific loss mitigation rules created to avoid unnecessary foreclosures. HUD has designed specific alternatives to foreclosure that lenders and their servicers must consider before they proceed with foreclosures.

Historically, mortgage lenders have only received FHA insurance proceeds after completing the foreclosure sale process, and evaluation for loss mitigation was always a precondition to foreclosure. DASP changes the timing of the insurance pay-out in an important way. Under DASP, HUD takes over ownership of the loans and pays off the FHA insurance claims before foreclosure takes place. The claims cover losses the loan’s owners incurred as a result of the homeowners’ default. So far through DASP, HUD has used the Fund to pay off claims for over 105,000 FHA-insured mortgage loans. None of these loans went through foreclosure before HUD auctioned them off. The private equity firms and hedge funds that bought most of the loans at DASP sales acquired them at significant discounts.

DASP is a fire sale that did not have to take place. The actions of a few large mortgage servicers, primarily Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan Chase, caused the long foreclosure delays that led HUD to implement DASP. HUD could have held these servicers accountable for the unprecedented delays they created, delays that harmed homeowners and threatened the soundness of the FHA insurance fund. HUD had ample legal authority to make its servicers review borrowers for loss mitigation and follow reasonable foreclosure time frames. Instead, HUD paid off the servicers’ claims early in order to avoid even greater future losses from delayed foreclosures. In the end, the big winners were the same large mortgage servicers that created the problem. Through DASP, HUD paid off the servicers’ claims and absolved them of responsibility for years of flouting the agency’s mortgage servicing rules. Meanwhile, homeowners and their communities are left to struggle with the consequences.

In 2012, when HUD began DASP, it was facing an insurance fund threatened by the burgeoning costs of the foreclosure delays that its servicers were orchestrating around the country. In addition, HUD’s outdated loss mitigation protocols were unsuited to the demands of an unprecedented foreclosure crisis. Auctioning off defaulted loans to financial speculators was one option available to HUD for restoring the health of the insurance fund. However, strengthening loss mitigation oversight would also have reduced losses to the fund. A loan modification, for example, avoids a post-foreclosure insurance claim entirely by replacing a loan in default with a performing loan. During 2012 and 2013, HUD announced a long-overdue restructuring of its loss mitigation options. HUD began to implement modification protocols more in line with those available under other government-insured and guaranteed loan programs. Effective implementation of these new FHA options, beginning in 2012, would have significantly reduced losses to the insurance fund. Instead, HUD opted to sell tens of thousands of loans that were in the foreclosure pipeline, making these loans ineligible for the improved FHA loss mitigation options.

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In implementing DASP, HUD accepted at face value its servicers’ rationales for the unprecedented foreclosure delays that began in 2010. In many cases, these delays extended over several years. According to the servicers, the delays were due to either new state laws that made foreclosures more time-consuming, or else to the servicers’ ramped-up efforts to help borrowers through reviews for loss mitigation. In reality, the state laws created during the foreclosure crisis did not impose burdensome new obstacles on foreclosing parties, and the servicers’ reviews for loss mitigation were haphazard at best.

Certain state laws implemented in the wake of the financial crisis require that mortgage servicers review homeowners for loss mitigation before foreclosing. These laws have the potential to strengthen and reinforce compliance with HUD rules. For example, mediation laws make FHA servicers show that they followed FHA guidelines before they are allowed to foreclose. Unfortunately, DASP undermines the impact of these helpful laws. Through DASP, FHA servicers can simply transfer the loans to new owners who then assert they are no longer bound by FHA rules. HUD pays the insurance claims to the pre-sale FHA servicers and allows them to avoid any obligation to show a court that they complied with FHA loss mitigation rules. In one telling instance involving Philadelphia homeowners discussed in this report HUD paid off insurance claims for 23 FHA-insured loans while all the homeowners were in the middle of mediations over loss mitigation. In HUD’s view, the DASP sales remove all FHA protections from a loan, even where the former FHA servicer did not comply with FHA rules. HUD’s lack of proper oversight and use of DASP has aided servicers in routinely selling off FHA-insured loans in order to get FHA insurance benefits without following either FHA requirements or state laws.

HUD’s claims of cost savings due to DASP necessarily assume two things: first, that the servicers conducted a thorough review for foreclosure alternatives for each loan before a DASP sale; and second, that all the borrowers were truly ineligible for any alternative to foreclosure under FHA’s guidelines. The examples of the homeowners abruptly pulled out of the FHA program by DASP sales while in the middle of mediations clearly show that HUD’s assumptions were wrong. Ignoring loss mitigation also entails costs. Any cost savings due to DASP cannot be evaluated without considering the costs of needless foreclosures and the resulting unnecessary insurance claims.

HUD’s contention that DASP helps homeowners is based on an abstract theory: That if you sell distressed loans to financial speculators at prices that seem like good deals to them, the speculators who buy the loans will modify them, reduce principal balances owed, or take similar steps to help the homeowners stay in their homes. The speculators will do this because they intend to sell the loans to someone else in a few years. At resale, the defaulted loans may bring in higher prices if they have turned into “performing” assets. The theory also assumes, of course, that whatever deal the speculator offers the homeowner after a DASP sale is better than any option the homeowner would have received had the loan remained an FHA loan serviced by a competent servicer.

HUD’s theory suffers from two major problems. First, Congress directed HUD to manage the FHA program to further certain policy

One critical goal of HUD is to help borrowers who could not otherwise achieve homeownership to stay in their homes. Private equity firms and hedge fund operators, the primary purchasers of the defaulted loans through DASP, are under no obligation to further this goal.
goals. One critical goal is to help borrowers who could not otherwise achieve homeownership to stay in their homes. Private equity firms and hedge fund operators, the primary purchasers of the defaulted loans through DASP, are under no obligation to further this goal. HUD, on the other hand, has an obligation to ensure its protocols are followed in order to satisfy this objective. Second, even the limited available data about the status of loans after DASP sales, including data provided by HUD, does not demonstrate that post-sale outcomes generally benefit homeowners. There is no evidence from the sales over the past four years that the speculative investors gave homeowners loan modifications that reduced the principal of the loans at any significant rate or that sustainable modifications were provided in substantial numbers. HUD has not produced any data showing the structure of modifications in the small number of cases where HUD claims loans were modified after DASP sales.

In reality, investors do not need to modify loans to make them “performing” after a DASP sale. There are much easier ways to tack a “performing” label on a loan. Common practices of the DASP purchasers include offering borrowers’ five-year “interest only” payment agreements that then revert to the original loan terms. These agreements do not modify basic loan terms. Instead, they simply postpone an inevitable re-default.

HUD’s own data show that in most cases the speculative DASP buyers did not modify the loans, and did not turn them into performing loans. Instead, they foreclosed or arranged short sales. HUD more recently began requiring speculators to offer borrowers “HAMP-like” modifications after DASP sales. However, HUD has not defined this requirement or described how it will be enforced. Unless HUD enhances oversight of its servicers and commits substantial resources to rigorous enforcement, there is little likelihood that HUD can capably enforce this kind of requirement against non-participants in the FHA program.

HUD has long-standing rules that authorize it to assess penalties against servicers who exceed reasonable diligence time frames for the conduct of loss mitigation reviews and completion of foreclosures. Similarly, HUD may penalize servicers that fail to demonstrate compliance with the requirements to review for all options under the FHA loss mitigation guidelines. HUD should use this authority. Failure to document compliance with HUD’s loss mitigation protocol must act as a complete bar to any loan sale. If HUD continues to conduct DASP sales, it must require that a servicer give the borrower clear advance notice of the intent to sell a loan. Borrowers must have an opportunity to raise and resolve with HUD servicers’ unfounded claims of compliance with HUD’s loss mitigation rules.

Since DASP’s inception almost four years ago, HUD has released vague and incomplete data that obscure essential outcome trends. The absence of reliable data allowed HUD to portray DASP as providing a benefit for homeowners. At the same time HUD has minimized the problems that occur when it cuts off FHA loss mitigation reviews through DASP sales. More recently, HUD has suggested it took concrete steps to address servicers’ inappropriate referrals of loans to DASP. However, HUD did not provide any clear, written explanation of these steps. Any such actions have not been effective. HUD should not continue to reply to criticism of DASP with periodic announcements of reforms that contain no specific details.
Historically, HUD has excluded homeowners from any role in the oversight of FHA servicers’ loss mitigation performance. DASP has only aggravated this problem. Note sales under DASP are completed before homeowners are aware their loans are sold. They lose the protections of the FHA program before they can raise objections. Effective enforcement of HUD’s loss mitigation rules with borrower participation through advance notice of sales and adherence to reasonable foreclosure timelines are the best ways to safeguard the FHA insurance fund from the costs of unnecessary or unduly delayed foreclosures. These changes must be prerequisites to any continued note sales.

The American homeownership rate is at a 20-year low. The ongoing erosion of homeownership from low-income families is likely to be of long duration, and for some families will be permanent. Low- and moderate-income communities have been substantially altered by mass foreclosures. In recent decades, FHA loans have been the primary means for African-American and Hispanic families to achieve homeownership. The unnecessary loss of FHA homeownership forces these households into the rental market. As rents around the country rise, the families pay increasingly high percentages of their income for housing, often 50% or more, while losing out on accruing wealth through homeownership. Instead of being pillars of stable communities, former homeowners must flee to wherever they can temporarily afford the rent. In a substantial number of cases, these outcomes are avoidable.

Vigorous enforcement of HUD’s loss mitigation rules would preserve homeownership and stabilize communities better than essentially unrestricted sales of the loans, often to financial speculators. To date, however, HUD has not held its major servicers accountable for their non-compliance with HUD’s own servicing rules. In the end, the mortgage servicers who caused the crisis for the FHA insurance fund walk away the winners. HUD pays the servicers’ inflated claims and the servicers often evade state laws meant to promote sustainable homeownership. The note sale program should continue only if it can be transformed to benefit homeowners, communities, and the Fund while preventing FHA servicers from escaping their obligations under FHA’s rules and avoiding accountability under state law for their conduct.

Vigorous enforcement of HUD’s loss mitigation rules would preserve homeownership and stabilize communities better than essentially unrestricted sales of the loans, often to financial speculators.
I. FOR DECADES, HUD’S FHA PROGRAM HAS PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP

Congress created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) under the National Housing Act in 1934 to help define federal housing policy during the Depression. FHA’s programs further Congress’ stated national housing goal of “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family.” The FHA is now part of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). FHA has insured over 34 million home mortgages since 1934. Currently, 4.8 million single-family mortgages are insured under FHA programs.

The FHA’s primary public purpose now is to expand homeownership for families not adequately served by the private mortgage markets. Over 80% of FHA-insured loans go to first-time homebuyers. HUD has described the intent of Congress in creating the FHA program:

*An important part of FHA’s mission is to provide financing to homebuyers who, compared to those served by the conventional market, have lower wealth and pose moderately higher risks but are still creditworthy. For this reason, FHA-insured mortgages have been the product of choice, and sometimes necessity, for low-income Americans, offering a pathway to the middle class and a chance to build wealth that can be passed down through generations.*

FHA’s share of the home purchase mortgage market has varied over time. Its share shrank to less than 10% during the subprime boom of 2005-2007. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the portion of all new home loans created with FHA financing increased significantly, to over 20%. In raw numbers, from 750,000 to one million families in the United States have obtained FHA-insured loans annually since 2009.

Since the recent financial crisis, the rates at which individuals in communities of color achieved homeownership dropped dramatically. To the extent that families of color obtain home purchase loans today, FHA loans play a critically important role. In 2014, FHA provided financing for 43% of all African-American borrowers, and 44% of all Hispanic borrowers.

FHA’s single family home loan program operates as an insurance program for mortgage loans made by private lenders. Contributions from borrowers support FHA’s insurance fund. The fund covers the lenders’ losses in the event of defaults. Federal law delegates to HUD the responsibility to protect the soundness of the FHA insurance fund. However, in managing the fund HUD must work to achieve dual objectives. Congress requires HUD “to meet the housing needs of the borrowers that the single family mortgage insurance program under this subchapter is designed to serve” while minimizing risk of default to the fund and to homeowners. By implementing DASP, HUD appears to have improved the financial position of the insurance fund; however, it has not supplied clear data to show how DASP meets the needs of FHA-insured borrowers and the neighborhoods in which they live. Under its legal mandate, HUD must make borrower stability as high a priority as the solvency of the fund.
Key Players and Terms in the FHA Program

Who are the owners of FHA-insured loans? Private lending institutions, such as banks, savings and loan associations, and mortgage companies, originate FHA-insured loans. These originators have sold many of the loans to investors, with the result that ownership interests in FHA-insured loans have often been securitized. Securitized mortgages end up held by a trust and the investors in the trust become the real owners of the loans. These trusts have little day-to-day involvement with the management of the loans in a trust portfolio. More recently, a growing percentage of FHA loans are originated by non-bank lenders.

Mortgage servicers play the key role. Mortgage servicing companies perform the core, ongoing work related to maintaining FHA-insured mortgage loans. The investors who own the loans enter into contracts with these servicers. It is the servicers who interact with homeowners, collect payments, manage escrow accounts, and make decisions regarding loss mitigation and foreclosure. The mortgage servicing industry is highly concentrated, with a few large servicers — Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and CitiMortgage — dominating the field. HUD must approve any financial institution that services an FHA loan. HUD publishes regulations, handbooks, and other directives that guide all aspects of servicing FHA mortgages. HUD has ample authority to supervise its servicers and ensure that they comply with the agency’s servicing rules.

The FHA Single-Family Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund. The FHA does not own mortgage loans. Instead, it manages an insurance fund that is available to cover losses incurred by the owner of a loan if the loan goes into default and must be foreclosed. The intent has always been that the FHA insurance fund be self-funding and not subsidized by taxpayers. Borrowers pay insurance premiums to FHA, and these premiums support the insurance fund. Borrowers pay a substantial part of their premium obligation when they take out an FHA-insured loan. They then make regular contributions to the fund along with each monthly mortgage payment. The FHA insurance fund incurred a significant deficit
in the course of the 2008 financial crisis. For the first time since its inception, the fund required Congressional appropriations. Since 2012, the fund has recovered. In 2015 the net worth of the FHA insurance fund was $23.8 billion.\textsuperscript{10}

**The importance of loss mitigation.** Federal statutes require that servicers of FHA-insured mortgages engage in loss mitigation when an FHA-insured mortgage goes into default.\textsuperscript{11} As the name suggests, loss mitigation is a process of considering less costly alternatives to foreclosure when a borrower has defaulted. Loss mitigation begins with the recognition that foreclosures are very expensive. The loan’s owners may lose 50% or more of the value of their investment when a loan must be foreclosed. An alternative to foreclosure, such as a loan modification, may cause the owners to lose some money. However, the ultimate loss from a modification is often smaller than the loss from foreclosure. Since the FHA insurance fund pays loan owners their losses on FHA loans, successful loan modifications also reduce losses to the fund.

**FHA's loss mitigation guidelines.** FHA has established loss mitigation guidelines that include a set of options that servicers must consider for each borrower in default.\textsuperscript{12} The home retention options include forbearance and repayment plans as well as two types of loan modifications. HUD revised these options substantially during 2012 and 2013, including a new calculation designed to achieve more affordable payments under FHA's version of HAMP (a loan modification program created by the U.S. Treasury Department).\textsuperscript{13} An FHA servicer may foreclose only if it has first reviewed the borrower for the mitigation options in a particular order and found the borrower ineligible for all of them.\textsuperscript{14} HUD has set out clear timelines for servicers to assess these options.\textsuperscript{15} Servicers must begin their efforts at the forty-fifth day of default.\textsuperscript{16} They must evaluate the borrower for all options on a monthly basis before the loan becomes four months in default.\textsuperscript{17} The servicer must continue to make loss mitigation available after initiating foreclosure.\textsuperscript{18} Many courts have ruled that servicers who fail to comply with FHA loss mitigation regulations cannot foreclose.\textsuperscript{19}
II. BACKGROUND ON THE DISTRESSED ASSET STABILIZATION PROGRAM (DASP)

A. HUD’s launch of the DASP program

In 2010, HUD began a pilot program to auction off small pools of defaulted FHA-insured loans. These pools typically contained a few hundred loans. Then, in 2012, HUD launched a stepped-up program to sell off much larger pools of loans. HUD called this new initiative the Distressed Asset Stabilization Program (DASP). DASP involves sales of pools of thousands of loans. During 2014, for example, HUD sold off a total of 45,979 FHA loans in four auction sessions.

DASP focuses on FHA-insured loans that are in default but have not yet gone through foreclosure sales. HUD auctions these loans in two types of pools. Most loans sold from 2012 through 2015 were included in what HUD calls national pools. Investors who buy loans in national pools can dispose of the loans and properties with few restrictions. As the name suggests, the national pools may include loans from any state. However, servicers select the loans to be sold, and they have chosen loans primarily from a limited number of states that use judicial foreclosures, such as Florida, New York, Ohio, and Indiana. Judicial foreclosures require court approval before a foreclosure sale can take place. A smaller share of loans sold through DASP came from “non-judicial” foreclosure states. In these states, a servicer can conduct a foreclosure sale without court oversight.

Aside from the national pools, HUD collects other loans into what it calls Neighborhood Stabilization Outcome (NSO) pools. NSO pools are regional. They have had targeted locations such as Chicago, Detroit, and metropolitan areas in Ohio and Florida. The buyers of NSO pools enter into agreements with HUD to achieve certain objectives for half the loans in the pool over a four-year reporting period. The qualifying objectives include accepting payments on a modified or unmodified loan for six months after purchase, selling the security property to an owner-occupant through a short sale or post-foreclosure sale, or renting out the property for three years. Under the terms of NSO bidding agreements, HUD can impose financial penalties on investors who buy an NSO pool and fail to meet one of the listed objectives for at least half the loans in the pool.

HUD conducted the first DASP auctions in September 2012. Since then, the volume of loans involved in DASP sales has increased significantly. From 2010 through November 2015, HUD auctioned off just over 105,000 defaulted FHA loans. Almost all of these were sold since the expanded DASP sales began in 2012. HUD sold the loans in about 175 different pools. Of the total loans sold, 80,983 loans were in national pools and 24,536 in NSO pools. The loans had a total unpaid principal balance of over $17.9 billion. HUD sold these loans for substantially less than the outstanding principal balances owed on them. For example, in sales over the past two years HUD sold the loans for from 52% to 66% of the amounts owed. The loans typically sold for less than the market values of the properties involved, as assessed by broker price opinions. The loans sold for 68% to 78% of the properties’ estimated values.

DASP represented a significant deviation from the way HUD typically paid off insurance claims. Under the pre-DASP practice, when a borrower defaulted on a mortgage, the servicer conducted a foreclosure sale. The foreclosure sale either transferred title to the property to a third party buyer or the servicer itself acquired title because no one else bid the amount of
the debt. When the servicer ended up with the property, it was considered an REO (real estate owned) property. The REO property would eventually be sold. In the end, the proceeds from the foreclosure sale or the REO sale would be applied to reduce the underlying mortgage debt. The servicer would then submit a claim for FHA insurance benefits to HUD. FHA insurance covered most of the private owners’ losses on the debt not recovered by the foreclosure sale process.

DASP changed the sequence in which HUD paid off an FHA insurance claim. Under DASP, the servicer assigns the mortgage to HUD before any foreclosure sale. The servicer receives the FHA insurance payoff when the loan is transferred to the DASP purchaser. A later foreclosure by the DASP purchaser has no impact on the pre-DASP owner of the loan or its servicer. At the same time, the purchaser will not be covered by FHA insurance and will not be able to submit an insurance claim to FHA.

The DASP sale has significant consequences for a homeowner. According to HUD, the sale immediately terminates the homeowner’s participation in the FHA program. The homeowner loses the right to be considered for options such as FHA-HAMP, a mortgage modification that can re-set monthly payments to affordable levels, as low as 25% of the household’s income. In HUD’s view, upon completion of the sale, the guidelines used to determine eligibility for all FHA loss mitigation options no longer apply to the mortgage. This occurs even though the homeowner paid substantial premiums to participate in the FHA program, a program that includes valuable options to retain the home in the face of hardship. While HUD contends that these loans already have exhausted FHA program options, this often is not the case.

After a DASP sale, servicing of the loan is transferred to a new servicer working for the investor who won the auction. At some point after the sale, homeowners receive notice that they have a new mortgage servicer. For most homeowners, the notice about a new servicer is how they

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**By the Numbers**

The 2008 economic crisis resulted in the largest number of foreclosures in U.S. history. HUD created a program to work through defaulted FHA-insured mortgage loans, eventually rolled out as the Distressed Asset Stabilization Program (DASP).

Government data shows that the DASP program primarily sells the loans for quick cash to large private equity funds and hedge funds. The result? The same mortgage servicers that contributed to the initial foreclosure problems are rewarded by early payment of their FHA insurance claims, to the detriment of low- and moderate-income homeowners and taxpayers.

| Year FHA begins defaulted loan sale pilot program: | 2010 |
| Year FHA ramps up the defaulted loan Distressed Asset Stabilization Program (DASP): | 2012 |
| Number of defaulted FHA loans sold from 2010 – Nov. 2015: | 105,000 |
| Number of FHA DASP loans sold in 2014: | 45,979 |
| Total value of unpaid principal balance of defaulted FHA Loans sold (2010 – Nov. 2015): | $17.9 billion |
| Average percentage of estimated market value of the properties received through DASP sales during 2014–2015: | 68% to 78% |
| Average percentage of estimated outstanding principal balances of loans received through DASP sales in 2014–2015: | 52% to 66% |
first learn that their mortgage was sold. Their participation in the FHA program is terminated without warning. They receive no explanation from HUD or anyone else of the severe consequences flowing from the DASP sale. In fact, when notified of the new servicer, homeowners may not be formally notified their FHA insurance was removed. The homeowners have no opportunity to object to the DASP sale even if they are in the process of being reviewed for an FHA loan modification as their loans are sold.

HUD could easily adopt a policy of notifying homeowners about a planned DASP sale, and it has authority to require its servicers to do so. The lack of notice to borrowers has been a consistent aspect of the DASP program since its inception.

B. Foreclosure Mediation Programs Reveal DASP’s Impact on Enforcement of FHA Loss Mitigation Guidelines

1. Philadelphia’s foreclosure conference system – a model program that stops foreclosures, promotes compliance with FHA rules, and helps lenders

The courts in Philadelphia led the way in developing a robust response to the foreclosure crisis. In 2008, the city’s courts inaugurated a program of mandatory settlement conferences for all residential foreclosures. Under the program’s rules the mortgage servicer must file a certificate of completion of a “conciliation” conference before it can proceed with a foreclosure sale. Conciliation sessions are scheduled automatically when a servicer files a foreclosure case involving an owner-occupied property.

Once the Philadelphia conference process is begun, the homeowner is expected to work with a housing counselor to complete and share documents. The housing counselor helps the homeowner prepare a proposal for the mortgage servicer to review before a conciliation conference. Most homeowners do not have direct legal representation in the conferences, but all have access to limited consultations with attorneys. Homeowners are represented by housing counselors at the sessions. For cases not resolved before a scheduled session, a civil case manager appointed by the court conducts the conciliation meeting. So long as the homeowner complies with the conciliation program rules, foreclosure proceedings, including the entry of judgment and the sheriff sale, are paused until the servicer files a certification that the conciliation process has concluded. If an agreement is not reached at an initial conference and additional review is needed, an order issues setting an additional session. The Philadelphia program has seen high rates of participation by homeowners, due in part to a system for direct door-to-door contacts by community groups to reach out to homeowners who have received notices of conciliation sessions.

A research firm’s report analyzing extensive data about the Philadelphia mediation program has documented its effectiveness. The firm examined court records of cases that went through the program from its inception in mid-2008 through March 2011. Based on court records and individual loan data, the authors created a long-term record of homeowners’ circumstances as they participated. Looking at the status of these cases from 2008 to 2011, the Reinvestment Fund made the following findings that demonstrate the program saves home and does not unreasonably delay foreclosures:

- 70% of homeowners eligible to participate in the program appeared for their mediation sessions.
3.5% of the homeowners who appeared for conferences in foreclosure cases filed since September 2008 had foreclosure sales of their homes ordered.33

35% of eligible homeowners who participated in conferences reached an agreement.34

53 days was the average that cases remained in the program, well within the 10-month time frame typical for the completion of a foreclosure in which the homeowner never appears.35

27% of eligible borrowers lost their homes as a consequence of a foreclosing filing before implementation of the program, but only 5.7% during a subsequent 6-month comparison period after the implementation of the program (looking at eligible cases before and after the program’s inception).36

87.5% of homeowners who reached agreements in the program between June 2008 and June 2009 were still in their homes as of March 31, 2011 (at least 21 months after the dates of their agreements).37

2. DASP allowed large servicers to receive FHA insurance claim payments without having to comply with Philadelphia’s foreclosure mediation program or FHA loss mitigation rules

Details from the Philadelphia mediation program make clear that large servicers have been able to use DASP to avoid participation in the court’s settlement conferences as well as FHA’s own loss mitigation program. For example, Bank of America has been one of the largest servicers of FHA-insured mortgages. It has also been the servicer most actively putting loans into DASP. An assumption underlying DASP is that a major servicer like Bank of America reviews its FHA-insured loans for all available loss mitigation options before referring the loans to HUD for a DASP sale. Another assumption is that HUD examines the status of servicers’ loss mitigation reviews to make sure the reviews are complete before accepting loans for DASP sales.

Yet, what actually happened during a short time period in 2014 to a group of 23 Philadelphia homeowners with FHA-insured loans demonstrates that loans are sold through DASP before FHA options are exhausted and apparently without any substantial examination by HUD. Looking at a period of just a few months, we identified 23 homeowners who were actively engaged in loss mitigation reviews with Bank of America when HUD sold their loans through DASP. These homeowners were appearing for court-supervised settlement conferences because they wanted Bank of America to review them for FHA loss mitigation options. Several of the homeowners had met numerous times with the bank’s representatives, some of them for five, six, or even as many as nine conference sessions. All the loss mitigation reviews in these cases were ongoing.

In each of the 23 cases, despite the fact that the mediations were scheduled to continue and FHA loss mitigation procedures were not completed, HUD sold the homeowners’ loans to speculators who were not in the business of offering reasonable loss mitigation. The result? The homeowners were told they had lost all access to the FHA program, including the right to be considered for an affordable modification based on a clearly defined protocol. Neither Bank of America nor HUD informed the homeowners that their loans were going to be sold or that their protections under FHA rules would no longer be offered. The homeowners discovered the facts only after the sales had taken place. The DASP sales happened while Bank of America’s representatives were continuing to request information and process forms for FHA loss mitigation
options. None of the homeowners received a final decision as to whether they qualified for FHA loss mitigation assistance. None of them ever received an FHA loss mitigation option.

This type of *en masse* exclusion of cases from loss mitigation reviews through DASP could happen anywhere in the country. The only thing that was unusual here was that, due to the structure of the mediation program, evidence of Bank of America’s DASP sales appeared

### TABLE 1

**FHA Distressed Asset Stabilization Program Cases in the Philadelphia Mediation Program (June–October 2014)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE DOCKET*</th>
<th>DATE MORTGAGE ASSIGNED TO HUD</th>
<th>STATUS AT DASP SALE</th>
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<td>Bank of America v. S.D. 130700---</td>
<td>10/1/2014</td>
<td>conferences ongoing after 6 sessions</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10/2/2014</td>
<td>conferences ongoing after 4 sessions</td>
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<td>10/2/2014</td>
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<td>conferences ongoing 2 sessions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank of America v. S.H. 140200---</td>
<td>10/1/2014</td>
<td>conferences ongoing 2 sessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9/9/2014</td>
<td>conference ongoing 1 session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of America v. E.C. 140400---</td>
<td>10/1/2014</td>
<td>conference ongoing 2 sessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of America v. A.S. 140600---</td>
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<td>conference ongoing 2 sessions</td>
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<td>10/2/2014</td>
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<td>9/9/2014</td>
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<td>conferences ongoing 5 conferences</td>
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<td>Bank of America v. B.B. 140703---</td>
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<td>Bank of America v. T.K. 140801---</td>
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<td>Bank of America v. E.R. 140603---</td>
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<td>Bank of America v. L.V. 131000---</td>
<td>2/4/2015</td>
<td>conferences ongoing after 9 sessions</td>
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<td>Bank of America v. F.W. 140402---</td>
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<td>conferences ongoing after 6 sessions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank of America v. D.M. 140602---</td>
<td>2/4/2015</td>
<td>conferences ongoing after 3 sessions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Full names of plaintiffs and last three digits of docket numbers were removed for privacy reasons.  
conspicuously in court and land records. Bank of America had so many cases pending for conferences that the Philadelphia court scheduled special “Bank of America Days” for the bank’s cases. These took place on August 14, 2014 and on October 16, 2014. After the two dates, these cases were suddenly taken off the Bank of America scheduling lists. Land records show that in proximity to these dates the mortgages were assigned to HUD and then transferred by HUD to speculators. As Table 1 (see page 14) indicates, many homeowners were working their way through multiple conference sessions in an effort to be reviewed for the FHA loss mitigation options their insurance payments had made potentially available.

**Philadelphia Homeowner Cases and Results of Exclusion from the FHA Program**

In each of these cases the homeowner submitted a loss mitigation application to Bank of America or was preparing to submit one. The stories of some of these homeowners demonstrate the impact of selling FHA loans before loss mitigation is over.

**Thomas and Beverly Henry**’s case is a typical example. The Henrys are a retired couple in Philadelphia. They have owned their home since 1977 and raised their children there. The Henrys began to apply to Bank of America for an FHA loan modification in 2010, after one spouse had to stop working to receive cancer treatment. They went through years of back and forth with the bank, never getting a clear answer on their eligibility. They repeatedly provided information about their retirement income, finally appearing for a settlement conference with Bank of America on August 14, 2014. At the settlement conference the Bank of America’s representative told the Henrys that the bank finally had all the information it needed to consider them for a loan modification. In reality, HUD had already sold the Henrys’ loan to a speculator operating outside HUD’s control. This sale had taken place in June 2014 without notice to the Henrys. The Henrys did not find out until October 2014 that Bank of America no longer serviced their loan. According to the new owner, Newland Asset Holding Trust, FHA protections no longer applied to their mortgage. The Henrys are still pursuing litigation just to find out what loss mitigation the new owner of the loan offers, if any.

**Edwin Cruz** lives with his two daughters in the predominately Latino neighborhood of Juniata, in Northeast Philadelphia. Bank of America approved Mr. Cruz for a trial modification under FHA guidelines in 2013. Mr. Cruz made all the payments needed to comply with the trial modification terms. Bank of America went on to approve him for a permanent FHA modification. Later, the bank claimed there had been some unspecified paperwork problem with the modification. The bank canceled the modification and filed a foreclosure complaint instead. Mr. Cruz continued to seek a modification. During 2014 and into 2015 Mr. Cruz participated in the foreclosure conference program and continued to send Bank of America the documents it was demanding. Only in early 2015 did he discover that HUD had sold his loan under DASP in June 2014. The investor who bought the loan at the DASP sale would only offer a loan modification that was contingent on Mr. Cruz’s making a large unaffordable initial payment. Conditioning a loan modification on an unreasonable lump sum payment
During 2014 and into 2015 Mr. Cruz participated in the foreclosure conference program and continued to send Bank of America the documents it was demanding. Only in early 2015 did he discover that HUD had sold his loan under DASP in June 2014.

Mr. Smith, like Mr. Cruz and the Henrys, must now resort to litigation to get a clear answer from the DASP buyer as to what its loss mitigation options are.

In response to incidents such as these, Philadelphia’s City Council passed a resolution in February 2016 calling on HUD and other federal agencies to stop conducting sales of distressed loans through procedures like these that harm homeowners and communities. The City has a strong interest in protecting the successful programs it has developed for preserving homeownership. DASP is a clear threat to those efforts.

The number of cases and clear pattern of loan sales during loss mitigation reviews is ample evidence of a structural problem with DASP and shows a significant lack of HUD oversight. A modest effort at competent oversight would have picked up that these loans were still in active loss mitigation review.

3. State and local foreclosure mediation programs to promote FHA loss mitigation

Since the foreclosure crisis began in 2008, foreclosure conference programs similar to Philadelphia’s have appeared in about half the states. Twelve states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes requiring conferences. The supreme courts of several states, including Ohio and New Jersey, have issued statewide rules authorizing mediations in foreclosure cases. As in Philadelphia, many local court systems have also set up their own foreclosure conference programs.

Other mediation and conference programs around the country have success records as impressive as Philadelphia’s. Connecticut has required mediation in residential foreclosure cases since 2008. Data provided by the Connecticut courts covering the period from July 2008 through December 31, 2015 showed that nearly 30,000 mediations were completed. Of these, 70% resulted in settlements in which the borrower stayed in the home. Significantly, 84% of the Connecticut cases that settled with an agreement for the borrower to remain in the home involved a loan modification.
In New York, a high proportion of eligible homeowners appear for settlement conferences scheduled automatically in foreclosure cases.\(^42\) Well over 100,000 conferences were held in a single year under the New York program. For certain reporting periods, homeowners appeared for conferences an average of 75% to 80% of the time. This represents a complete reversal of the status quo prior to the initiation of the mandatory conferences, when 75% to 80% of homeowners did not participate in their cases. The majority of homeowners appeared for conferences with attorney representation.

Mediation and conference programs benefit lenders and homeowners. The modifications that occur in place of foreclosures typically set terms based on a net present value test.\(^43\) These tests determine that the modification is more in the financial interest of investors in the loan than a foreclosure sale. Of particular importance in the case of FHA loans, these conferences provide a valuable form of oversight over the servicers’ compliance with HUD loss mitigation rules. The FHA’s rules can form the basis for negotiations and reviews. The programs prevent unnecessary foreclosures of FHA-insured loans, benefitting the HUD insurance fund.

### New York Conference Cases

In New York, DASP has also impeded mediations that could have improved the performance of FHA loans. For example, Brooklyn homeowner **Paulette Morrison** was participating in the New York foreclosure conference program during 2014. She repeatedly submitted documents to Bank of America for years without getting a decision on her eligibility for an FHA modification. Without notice to her, Bank of America sold her mortgage loan through DASP. Rushmore, as servicer for the DASP buyer, then appeared for settlement conferences and would not consider a loan modification unless Ms. Morrison first made an up-front payment equal to 25% of the overdue payments and fees. This outlandishly high payment was well beyond anything she could afford. Had her loan remained FHA insured, Ms. Morrison would never have faced such an unreasonable barrier to a modification. Servicers of FHA loans may not demand up-front payments to begin a modification.

**Lorenzo Morrison** had a similar experience in the New York settlement conferences.\(^44\) He had submitted a full loss mitigation application to his servicer, JP Morgan Chase. His attorneys went through the eligibility requirements for an FHA loan modification. Mr. Morrison met all requirements without a hitch. However, while the conference sessions to review the application were taking place, HUD sold Mr. Morrison’s loan to a private investor. Caliber, servicing the loan for the new owner, would only offer a five year interest-only forbearance as a loss mitigation alternative. Under Caliber’s offer, Mr. Morrison would pay $70,000 over five years to the servicer and never reduce his principal balance. At the end of five years the payment level that drove him into foreclosure would be restored. A servicer subject to FHA rules would never be permitted to offer this kind of unfair and deceptive proposal.
III. DASP’S PRIMARY ROLE IS TO MANAGE SERVICERS’ FORECLOSURE DELAYS

A. HUD Failed to Stop Servicer Delays and Then Responded with DASP

Since the goal of the FHA program is to expand homeownership, especially for lower-income families, HUD’s efforts cannot stop once a family gets an FHA-backed mortgage and moves into a home. HUD must also help that family keep the home. Indeed, Congress has mandated that servicers of FHA-insured mortgages offer the borrower loss mitigation options if the loan goes into default.45 HUD requires servicers to begin exploring these options within 45 days after default, and to move expeditiously to resolve the default either by working out a loss mitigation alternative or by bringing the case to foreclosure.

HUD’s foreclosure processing timelines address its concern that long delays in a foreclosure process undermine the FHA insurance fund. To address this concern, HUD has authority to assess monetary penalties when servicers exceed foreclosure time frames,46 and can even bar non-compliant servicers from participating in the FHA program.

Dragging out the foreclosure process can also hurt homeowners. Accruing interest, foreclosure costs, attorney fees, and servicing fees build up every month during a foreclosure, becoming an impediment to saving the home. More importantly, the foreclosure process in many states provides a mechanism for ensuring that options to save the home are considered. This has been particularly true in recent years, as states responded to the foreclosure crisis by creating foreclosure mediation and foreclosure diversion programs. These programs forced servicers to cut through the red tape that homeowners faced. It forced them to focus on the individual homeowner and address the question of whether the home could be saved. Unnecessary delays in the foreclosure process can mean postponing the exploration of these options until it is too late to save the home.

Since long delays in exploring loss mitigation or pursuing foreclosure undermine the FHA insurance fund, one would expect that during the foreclosure crisis FHA would have vigorously enforced its requirements that servicers adhere to schedules. But the opposite was true. Servicers delayed foreclosures on FHA loans for months or even years, including in states with strong, successful foreclosure mediation programs. Instead of taking steps to resolve these delays, HUD created the DASP program, which deprives the homeowners of both the benefits of FHA’s loss mitigation guidelines and the foreclosure process’s role in enforcing those guidelines. While selling the loan is one approach for loans that have exhausted the FHA loss mitigation guidelines, for those still midstream, the sales deny homeowners the benefits of the FHA program for which they have paid.

B. HUD’s Requirements for Processing Foreclosures Are Sidestepped by Servicers Selling Loans Into DASP

HUD has employed DASP largely in response to its servicers’ unwillingness to conduct foreclosures in a timely fashion. Yet, HUD has always had the power to ensure that its servicers complete foreclosures efficiently and without undue delays. For decades, HUD directives have required FHA servicers to exercise what HUD defines as “reasonable diligence” in prosecuting foreclosures to completion.47 The Secretary of HUD establishes reasonable diligence time frames for all states. The reasonable diligence time frames take into account each state’s
foreclosure laws. Investors may not be fully reimbursed for unpaid interest when servicers delay foreclosures beyond these time frames. HUD revises the schedule periodically, as it did in 1990, 2001, 2005, 2013, and 2015.\textsuperscript{48} Between 1990 and the appearance of DASP in 2012, HUD’s reasonable diligence time frames did not change significantly. HUD generally allowed longer times for states that required judicial foreclosure as opposed to states that permitted non-judicial foreclosures.

HUD’s due diligence time frames start with the first legal action that a state law requires to begin a foreclosure and end when the lender acquires title to and possession of the property.\textsuperscript{49} The ten states with the longest allowable FHA foreclosure time frames have always been judicial foreclosure states. Table 2 shows the number of months HUD allowed to complete foreclosures in the ten judicial foreclosure states with the longest foreclosure timelines. The table also shows HUD’s revisions of the allowed times between 1990 and 2016. Table 3 (see page 20) gives the same information for the ten states with the shortest FHA foreclosure time frames. The ten shortest periods all apply to non-judicial foreclosure states.

| TABLE 2 |
| FHA Foreclosure Time Frames in Ten Judicial Foreclosure States with Longest Foreclosure Time (by Months) |

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(months from beginning to completion of foreclosure)

* 21 = New York City cases and 27 = Other New York cases


Notably, there was little change to the allowed foreclosure time frames from the 1990s to 2013. HUD increased a few states’ foreclosure time lines in 2013.\textsuperscript{50} However, in a new schedule that went into effect in January 2016, HUD dramatically lengthened the allowed foreclosure time frames for several states\textsuperscript{51} HUD took this action in response to patterns of delayed foreclosures in these states, particularly in New York. There were no compelling justifications for these changes based on newly enacted state laws.\textsuperscript{52} With these changes, HUD did little more that ratify the unilateral actions its servicers had taken to slow down foreclosures in particular states.
The patterns of servicer delays were reflected in the make-up of DASP auction pools. More than 50% of the properties sold under DASP from 2012 through 2015 were located in six states: Florida, New Jersey, Illinois, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. All are judicial foreclosure states, and since 1990, the six consistently ranked among the states with the longest foreclosure time frames.

HUD’s due diligence time frames play an important role in minimizing abuse of the FHA insurance fund. For example, if a servicer drags out a foreclosure for six months beyond the reasonable diligence time, the fund must pay out an additional six months of foreclosure fees and property maintenance costs when it pays the insurance claim after foreclosure. The property may deteriorate and have a reduced resale value. To deter servicer abuses of foreclosure delays, HUD has authority to assess monetary penalties when servicers exceed due diligence and loss mitigation time frames. These penalties can include amounts equal to claim amounts improperly paid out. HUD can limit and even bar non-compliant servicers from participating in the FHA program.

The typical loan sold under DASP was in a stage of default that should never have existed if HUD had enforced its own requirements. DASP sales have involved loans that were in default well beyond any reasonable due diligence foreclosure time frame. The loans sold so far through DASP were in default for an average of 29 months when the sales were completed. Through 2015, HUD’s due diligence time frames permitted foreclosures to last in excess of twelve months in only six states. The longest allowed time applied to New York, at nineteen months. Thus, the typical loan sold under DASP was in a stage of default that should never have existed if HUD had enforced its own requirements.

### TABLE 3
**FHA Foreclosure Time Frames in Ten Non-Judicial Foreclosure States with Shortest Foreclosure Time (by Months)**

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(months from beginning to completion of foreclosure)

In addition to setting time frames for completing foreclosures, HUD fixes times for servicers to perform other obligations while a mortgage is in default. Servicers have a duty to complete reviews for loss mitigation by certain benchmark dates. The obligation to perform these reviews in a timely fashion goes hand in hand with the duty to proceed to foreclose with due diligence. By the end of the second month of delinquency, the servicer must give the borrower a written solicitation for a loss mitigation review. Before the loan is three months in default, the servicer has to make reasonable efforts to conduct a face-to-face meeting with the borrower to discuss loss mitigation. An initial loss mitigation review must be completed within ninety days of the default. The servicer must conduct regular reviews thereafter. Timely compliance with these loss mitigation review requirements is a condition to the valid foreclosure of an FHA mortgage.

The unresolved delinquencies for DASP loans, extending on average 29 months when the sales are completed, have no place under FHA’s servicing guidelines. HUD’s regulations do not allow a servicer to create long “black hole” periods during foreclosures while the servicer refrains from reviewing the borrower for loss mitigation. Delays without any servicer intervention put the borrower in the worst possible position. The borrower faces mounting costs to reinstate while the options to maintain homeownership become less viable. Meanwhile, these long periods of servicer inactivity drain money unnecessarily from the FHA insurance fund.

C. Servicers Delayed Foreclosures in Key States after Their Systematic Mishandling of Foreclosure Proceedings Was Exposed

Foreclosure numbers rose to unprecedented levels in 2009. During the following year, nationwide media attention focused on mortgage servicers’ systematic mishandling of foreclosure proceedings. By the end of 2010, multiple government agencies were investigating the servicers’ foreclosure activities. At the same time, a major title insurer indicated it would cease insuring foreclosure titles for two of the largest servicers. The Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision were beginning an interagency review of foreclosure practices of 14 large servicers. These federal agencies eventually found critical, pervasive weaknesses in the servicers’ supervision of attorneys, oversight of contractors, and document preparation. During 2010, the mortgage servicers faced investigations of their foreclosure activities at the state level as well. In October 2010, 49 state attorneys general launched a joint investigation into the foreclosure practices of the five largest mortgage servicers. Several federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of Justice, joined the state officials’ investigations. The entities under investigation included the largest servicers of FHA loans: Bank of America, Wells Fargo, CitiCorp, and JP Morgan Chase.

The mortgage servicers’ pervasive misconduct came to light largely in judicial foreclosure states. The availability of court scrutiny in these states played a crucial role in uncovering the wrongdoing. Certain state courts took their own remedial action against the abuses. For example, the chief judges of the New York and New Jersey courts instituted new documentation requirements for foreclosure cases in an effort to combat the practice of robo-signing.

The mortgage servicers responded to this scrutiny in a variety of ways. In early 2011, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and GMAC temporarily ceased all foreclosure activity. What followed for the remainder of 2011 was a substantial slowdown of foreclosure activity. The new status quo involved both declines in commencement of new foreclosures as well as the
suspension of cases already in the foreclosure pipeline. As of April 2011, the rate of commencement of new foreclosures and the conduct of foreclosure sales were at a 40-month low nationwide, down 34% from April 2010. In judicial foreclosure states these rates were down by 47%. As of mid-2011 foreclosure filings in New Jersey were down by 87% for the year compared to one year earlier. Through 2012, the inventory of delinquent loans in foreclosure continued to grow, with the “foreclosure pipeline” ratio in judicial states becoming more than twice the level in non-judicial states.

The five largest mortgage servicers reached a settlement with the 49 state attorneys generals and federal agencies in March 2012. There was an expectation that this settlement would end servicers’ concerns about their vulnerability to future legal challenges and lead to a resumption of normal foreclosure scheduling. This did not happen. The number of scheduled sales and the number of homes owned by banks after completed foreclosure sales decreased substantially during 2012. As of early 2013, the inventory of properties in the foreclosure pipeline (foreclosure commenced but no auction scheduled) had increased nearly 60% from one year earlier. Nationally, it would not be until late 2014 that the year-to-year comparisons in the number of foreclosure sales would show a true increase from the late 2010 levels.

CHART 1

Annual Percentage Change in Scheduled Foreclosure Auctions
(as of October 2014)

Source: RealtyTrac
In New York, the processing of foreclosure cases reflected this national trend. The filing of new foreclosure cases dropped precipitously after October 2010, when the state’s Chief Judge issued the order requiring servicers’ attorneys to execute certifications that they had properly verified loan documents. There had been 47,664 new foreclosure cases filed in New York during 2009 and 46,572 during 2010. The filings dropped to 16,655 in 2011 and 25,411 in 2012. The new foreclosure filings did not rise again to the 2010 level until 2013.

The resumption of a more typical rate of new foreclosure filings in New York did not tell the whole story. Toward the end of 2012, the New York Court Administrator observed that servicers were not moving cases ahead to foreclosure sales after they filed foreclosure complaints in the courts. In a 2012 report, the New York Court Administrator noted that due to this trend “there is an inventory of thousands of cases that have technically been commenced, but are not before the court.” These cases became a “shadow inventory.” During 2013, the New York court system faced a serious problem in dealing with this shadow inventory. Because the servicers’ attorneys were not filing required documents to move the cases forward, the court was forced to set up special procedures to compel them to do so. Ultimately, the New York court system had to devote substantial personnel and resources to identifying the shadow foreclosure docket cases and making the servicers’ attorneys prosecute them.

The servicers’ delays in New York had a direct negative impact on borrowers. Unless the servicers filed documents indicating that the case was ready to proceed to a judge, the borrowers could not participate in the court’s foreclosure settlement conference program. Thus, the servicers’ inaction effectively barred homeowners from this important opportunity for a loss mitigation review. The situation deteriorated to the point where legal services attorneys filed a class action lawsuit in federal court seeking redress from the servicers’ failure to move their foreclosure cases forward.

If a case eventually made its way into New York’s foreclosure settlement conference program, servicers created more delays by stalling in the conferences. In numerous instances, servicers failed to participate in the conferences in good faith. As a result, conference sessions were continued multiple times, delaying meaningful loss mitigation reviews. A 2013 survey of the New York foreclosure conferences revealed that 80% of the sessions were continued because servicers appeared without full authority or the necessary information to discuss loss mitigation.

As of the end of 2011, New York and New Jersey were considered the states with the longest foreclosure time frames, at about two and one-half years for both states. Yet there was nothing inherent about the foreclosure procedures in effect in these states that justified these extraordinary delays. In both states the chief judges had entered orders that essentially directed attorneys not to lie in documents they filed with the courts. New Jersey courts have interpreted this certification requirement to add nothing to an attorney’s pre-existing duty to present facts truthfully to the courts. Similarly, servicers have a duty under most investor guidelines, including under FHA rules, to review borrowers for all available loss mitigation opportunities.
options before they complete a foreclosure. The New York conference statute required only that the servicer show that it had conducted a good faith review of loss mitigation options before it could foreclose. Servicers in compliance with FHA rules should have had no problem meeting all requirements of the New York conference statute, and without any delay. Servicers’ participation in settlement conferences such as those required under the New York law should play a vital role in reducing losses to the FHA insurance fund.

The mortgage servicers’ pattern of stalling in loss mitigation conference programs was not limited to New York. Mortgage servicers went to great lengths in certain other states to avoid foreclosure mediation programs. For example, from 2010 to 2012, three non-judicial foreclosure jurisdictions—Oregon, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia—enacted new laws requiring foreclosure mediation. These laws applied to all non-judicial foreclosures in these states and required that servicers participate in a loss mitigation review before a foreclosure sale could take place. In each state, mortgage servicers reacted to the new mediation laws by stopping foreclosures almost entirely. In the District of Columbia, there was on average 234 foreclosures monthly before the mediation law went into effect in 2010. In 2011 the number fell to 20 monthly, and in 2012 only 89 foreclosures took place over the entire year. The servicers suspended foreclosure sales in the District of Columbia solely to avoid mediations. In Hawaii and Oregon servicers initially evaded mediations by avoiding non-judicial sales and resorting to lengthier judicial foreclosures. The mediation requirements in these two states did not apply to judicial foreclosures. Eventually the legislatures in Hawaii and Oregon had to amend their state statutes to require that mediations apply to judicial foreclosures as well.

Florida is another state, like New York, associated with long delays during the foreclosure crisis. Like New York, Florida also had to devote substantial resources to forcing mortgage servicers to move their foreclosures cases forward. During 2010-2011, Florida spent $9.6 million to implement a “rocket docket” to speed up foreclosures. Then, in 2013, Florida used $36 million in funds the state received from the 49-state National Mortgage Settlement to expedite foreclosures. The state set a goal of closing out 700 foreclosure cases per day. An investigation into the reasons for this massive investment of public funds observed that “state court officials laid blame for the backlog of cases squarely in the laps of mortgage lenders, saying they weren’t pursuing cases and they often didn’t have the proper paperwork to prove they had the right to foreclose.”

D. HUD Recognized the Need to Protect the FHA Insurance Fund from the Impact of Servicers’ Foreclosure Delays

By early 2011, HUD recognized that servicers’ foreclosure delays had become a serious problem. In March 2011, HUD reported to Congress that the time FHA loans were spending in foreclosure “has risen due to various delays in foreclosure processing imposed by servicers.” FHA’s in-foreclosure inventory was at a historic high, 27% higher than a year earlier. These delays had a direct impact on the FHA insurance fund.

When the foreclosure crisis began, HUD allocated funds from its capital reserve account to pay the high volume of insurance claims it expected to receive from servicers over the next three years. Up until late 2010, servicers submitted post-foreclosure insurance claims to HUD at rates consistent with actuarial predictions based on the number of loans in default. But by early 2011, this trend had changed. Servicers’ insurance claims were coming in at a
total dollar amount 38% less than predicted.94 Widespread foreclosure delays were causing this lower than anticipated level of new claims. In December 2009, only 5.8% of FHA loans in foreclosure were in foreclosure for 19 or more months. By the end of 2011, 25% of FHA loans in foreclosure were pending for this long.95

As servicers refrained from submitting FHA insurance claims, HUD realized that the major impact of the servicers’ inaction would be felt in the future, when the insurance fund would face a high volume of inflated claims. Notably, the slowdown in servicers’ submission of insurance claims did not reflect a decrease in the rate at which loans were going into default. FHA loans were continuing to default at rates consistent with actuarial predictions. The percentage of FHA-insured loans that were in seriously delinquent status remained at a consistently high level from 2010 through 2013.96 If not for what HUD termed the servicers’ “foreclosure process delays” the actual number of insurance claims being submitted from 2010 through 2013 would have been near or above projections.97

HUD was clearly aware of the reasons behind this slowdown. HUD explained the context in its 2011 Annual Report to Congress on the status of the FHA fund:

“Foreclosure processing delays began early in FY 2011, after revelations that major loan servicers had utilized so-called “robo-signing” procedures. Such practices included routine failure to properly validate legal standing to initiate foreclosure actions, or even to document borrower default. As a result of public revelations of these problems, several major U.S. mortgage lenders suspended foreclosures across the United States in the fall of 2010.”98

In the same report HUD went on to note that federal bank regulators and other federal agencies continued to investigate servicers’ foreclosure documentation practices. Aside from the servicers’ paperwork problems, HUD cited a second reason for the growing foreclosure delays. According to HUD, “additional process delays arise because numerous States have recently modified their laws to require servicer interaction with borrowers prior to foreclosure initiation, and the courts have been involved in declaring some foreclosure actions illegal.”99 HUD was referring to the new mediation and conference laws that were attempting to hold servicers accountable for reviewing borrowers for loss mitigation protocols, including FHA’s guidelines, before foreclosure sales.100 When servicers follow the mediation program rules in good faith, these programs do not delay foreclosures.101 Most foreclosure mediation programs were set up to work within existing foreclosure time frames under state laws.

HUD reported in 2011 that delays were appearing at two distinct places in foreclosure proceedings. First, servicers were “purposefully delaying” filing claims after foreclosures, sometimes for up to 12 months, until potential challenges to improper foreclosures were resolved.102 Second, the inventory of cases in foreclosure but pre-auction was increasing because servicers were reviewing documentation to make sure they would pass court scrutiny before a foreclosure sale.103 The greatest concentration of cases with long delays was appearing in judicial foreclosure states. HUD noted that it had to adjust its foreclosure loss calculations to create different models for judicial and non-judicial states.104

The pattern of delayed foreclosures starts and delayed submission of insurance claims continued during 2011, 2012, and 2013. During 2011, the number of insurance claims submitted and the dollar amounts of the claims paid out was 25% to 35% below estimates that had assumed timely foreclosures.105 HUD noted that “[a] contributing factor to this gap continues to be
delays in foreclosure processing due to so-called robo-signing problems experienced by many major lenders.” 106 During 2012, the prolonged delays led to the payout of claims at approximately half the level anticipated. 107

HUD initially assumed that the settlement reached in the 49 state attorney general’s investigation would return the rate of submission of FHA insurance claims to the appropriate level. 108 However, at the beginning of 2013, the number of claims submitted continued to be roughly half what HUD had projected based on the high number of loans in default. According to HUD in early 2013, the “principal contributing factor to this gap continues to be delays in foreclosure processing in many areas of the country.” 109 As of mid-2013, new foreclosure starts were still occurring at the same low level as at the end of 2011, before the state attorney general’s settlement. 110

The delays in paying out FHA insurance claims meant that each claim, when paid late, would be substantially higher than it would have been if the servicer had timely completed the foreclosure. Each year’s delay in completion of a foreclosure meant additional costs, fees, and property deterioration costs that HUD would have to pay from the FHA insurance fund.

E. DASP Responded to the Foreclosure Delays

HUD turned to DASP to reduce the losses caused by servicers’ delayed submission of post-foreclosure insurance claims. The note sales avoid costs associated with waiting for servicers to conduct foreclosure sales and then to manage and market the underlying collateral as an REO property. 111

At the time it implemented DASP, HUD had other options for compelling its servicers to comply with long-standing FHA requirements for timely completion of foreclosures. For example, HUD could have threatened to impose meaningful sanctions on servicers who deliberately delayed proceedings. Non-complying servicers could have been excluded from the FHA program. Instead, HUD developed DASP as a means to address delays while relieving servicers from compliance with the state foreclosure laws. This occurred despite the fact that some of these state laws, if properly followed, would ensure that servicers complied with FHA rules, including the rules requiring effective reviews for loss mitigation.

The first large-scale DASP sale took place in September 2012. Through 2013, HUD reported that servicers’ delays were continuing to keep insurance claims inappropriately low, but “[c]laims activity should move closer to the actuarial predications as HUD continues its efforts to sell delinquent mortgages out of the foreclosure pipeline through its Distressed Asset Sale Program (DASP).” 112 Gradually, as a consequence of DASP, HUD began to pay out more insurance claims earlier in the foreclosure process. During 2013, the FHA insurance fund had a net cash outflow of $3.6 billion. During 2014 the net cash outflow rose to $6.4 billion. 113 HUD attributed much of this increase to payment of claims through DASP. 114
Payment of FHA insurance claims through DASP sales became the predominant HUD alternative to payment of the claims after servicers worked through the slower post-foreclosure REO sale process. At the time it implemented DASP, HUD acknowledged the program’s direct effect on the rate of payment of insurance claims related to the foreclosure slowdowns. According to HUD, the “DASP auctions have enabled HUD to reduce potential loss exposure by directly addressing the large backlog of foreclosure actions that has accumulated since 2009.” According to HUD, “DASP was instrumental in FHA’s efforts to reduce the backlog of seriously delinquent loans resulting from foreclosure moratoriums instituted by servicers prior to the completion of the National Servicing Settlement.” Considered solely as a means to accelerate payment of insurance claims, DASP appeared to work.

F. DASP Undermined HUD’s Helpful Revisions to its Loss Mitigation Guidelines

DASP was part of a larger HUD strategy to relieve stress on the FHA insurance fund. Another means by which HUD hoped to reduce losses from the fund was to re-design the loss mitigation options that it offered to borrowers. HUD recognized that improved loss mitigation strategies could benefit the insurance fund. Therefore, in 2012 the agency announced significant changes to its loan modification options. HUD indicated that the revised loss mitigation policies would be geared towards greater payment relief for borrowers, including allowing modifications to set payment levels as low as 25% of borrowers’ household income. HUD acknowledged that “[t]his approach will yield lower claim costs for FHA while also reducing repayment speeds for insured loans, both of which will positively impact the MMI Fund.”

In 2012 HUD chose to follow two paths to deal with the unprecedented losses from the insurance fund that had occurred since 2008. One strategy was to implement more effective loss mitigation options designed to prevent foreclosure sales. The other was to terminate loans’ participation in the FHA insurance program early, before foreclosures were completed. These strategies did not have to work at cross-purposes. A balanced approach that included rigorous application of the improved FHA loss mitigation protocols in conjunction with note sales could have worked harmoniously. Unfortunately, the servicers’ loss mitigation compliance remained weak while the note sales accelerated. Although HUD was clearly aware of the potential of better loss mitigation to improve the financial status of the fund while simultaneously saving homes, it does not appear that HUD performed any significant analysis to quantify the benefit of effective loss mitigation or to enable any comparison to the effect of the DASP program.

Historically, servicers’ compliance with FHA loss mitigation rules was consistently poor, with few repercussions for the servicers who ignored the rules. This lack of compliance continued with the DASP program, despite the simultaneous implementation of FHA’s new loss mitigation rules. DASP became a tool servicers could use to evade FHA’s loss mitigation requirements and have their insurance claims paid. At the same time DASP opened a path for servicers to avoid the application of state laws designed to promote compliance with FHA’s loss mitigation rules. As discussed next, DASP marked a dramatic departure from long-standing HUD practices for payment of FHA insurance claims.
G. HUD’s Troubling Shift to Payment of Insurance Claims Without Foreclosure

During 2012 and 2013 HUD embarked upon what it described as “new approaches to claim resolution and asset disposition.” These approaches, primarily involving DASP, marked a shift away from its traditional practice of payment of FHA insurance claims after completion of foreclosures. Prior to 2012, HUD relied primarily on the foreclosure sale process to trigger lender insurance claims. Before DASP, HUD paid out only a small portion of all FHA insurance claims through alternatives, such as after short sales. For example, in 2011 approximately 80% of FHA insurance claims were paid through the traditional process after foreclosure sales, while only 20% of claims were paid through various alternatives.

By 2013, HUD had concluded that REO sales were too expensive to serve as the primary property disposition method. By 2014-15, HUD was paying most insurance claims (over 55%) through the alternatives processes that did not involve a completed foreclosure. This was largely due to the increase in DASP sales. This change has meant that since 2013 HUD paid out most FHA insurance claims related to defaulted mortgages without a foreclosure sale.

HUD’s assumption behind the new emphasis on alternatives to foreclosure sales was that this strategy would produce smaller losses from the insurance fund. Initially at least, this did not turn out to be true. Loans sold under DASP in 2013 produced greater losses on average than loans terminated through the traditional foreclosure sale process. HUD explained these outcomes by pointing to “unique characteristics” of the loans selected for DASP sales. HUD pointed out that “[t]he Note Sale program was used to assist in clearing the big foreclosure backlog created during the robo-signing litigation.” Therefore the properties secured by DASP loans were “mostly located in judicial states and which experience delayed foreclosure actions.” In other words, the concentration of DASP properties in judicial foreclosure states drove the higher loss rates for DASP sales. DASP sales involved loans that would have incurred particularly high losses if left to dispositions that involved completed judicial foreclosures. Compared to the cost incurred through foreclosure sales in the same judicial foreclosure jurisdictions, HUD still considered DASP sales to be the less costly alternative.

During 2014 and 2015, the note sales produced smaller losses on average than completed foreclosure sales. These results supported HUD’s assumption that selling off loans early in the foreclosure process would result in smaller losses to the insurance fund than waiting until after a foreclosure sale to pay the claim. Given that servicers continue to select DASP loans primarily from a few judicial foreclosure states, the financial benefit to the insurance fund seems to hold true even when crisis-driven “backlogs” of foreclosure cases shrink.

Since the foreclosure crisis began, foreclosure losses in the range of 50%-60% of the loan balance have not been unusual for most types of loans. On average, the loss rate from post-default dispositions of FHA-insured properties declined from 63.5% in the first quarter of 2010 to 51.3% in the fourth quarter of 2015. These general FHA loss rates included losses from all types of default dispositions, including traditional REO sales after foreclosures, short sales, and DASP sales. HUD also touts DASP’s success by reporting that from fiscal years 2012 through 2015 the amounts bid at DASP auctions improved from 40% of unpaid principal balance to approximately 60%.
It must be noted, however, that significant causes unrelated to DASP have reduced losses from the FHA insurance fund since 2012. With new financial forces moving into the distressed asset sale market, bidding at foreclosure auctions has become more competitive. As a result, losses per foreclosure have decreased across the board, both for HUD’s traditional foreclosure sale dispositions and for alternative disposition methods such as DASP. For example, the average loss rate from post-foreclosure REO sales of FHA loans was 71.7% in FY 2011. The loss rate dropped to 56.7% in FY 2015. These improved REO sale outcomes translate to a significant decline in the overall insurance fund loss rate even without DASP. It is true that loss rates from more recent DASP sales have been lower than losses from post-foreclosure REO sales (49.8% loss rate for DASP sales compared to 56.7% for traditional REO sales in 2015). However, the fund’s loss rates would have shown a major decline after 2012 levels absent DASP. In addition, HUD is unable to quantify the losses caused by the failure to perform appropriate loss mitigation on many loans sold through DASP or otherwise improperly foreclosed. While some subset of DASP sales might be an appropriate measure, sales of loans that have not completed FHA loss mitigation reviews cannot be justified, even with the lower loss ratios.

There is obviously some financial benefit to the FHA insurance fund in cutting out the time needed to comply with procedures required by certain state foreclosure laws. The pertinent question, however, should not be whether we can identify some benefit in an analysis that looks at DASP in isolation. The real question is at what overall cost does this benefit come? Does the benefit outweigh other harm that DASP causes? Should DASP be one tool among many, rather than the primary tool to address foreclosure backlogs? These questions are particularly important because HUD restructured and improved its loss mitigation options to provide real alternatives to foreclosure at the same time that it expanded its note sales.

H. What Might Have Been: HUD’s Missed Opportunity to Apply its Improved Loss Mitigation Program to the Backlog of Foreclosure Crisis Cases

The major participants in the mortgage servicing industry revised their loss mitigation options dramatically in response to the foreclosure crisis. Beginning in 2009, the overwhelming majority of home mortgages in default were eligible for review for some form of modification under the U.S. Treasury Department’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Nearly all large servicers signed on to the HAMP program. Servicers of loans owned or guaranteed by one of the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were obligated to review borrowers in default for HAMP options. From 2009 through 2011, servicers permanently modified 933,000 mortgage loans under the Treasury and GSE HAMP programs. Significant payment reductions came with these modifications. The typical Treasury HAMP modification reduced the borrower’s payment by 36%. Because these reductions created affordable payments, borrower re-default rates were consistently lower than under non-HAMP modifications.

During the period of unprecedented mortgage modification activity from 2009 through 2011, FHA’s loss mitigation program lagged behind market developments. FHA had not significantly revised its loss mitigation options since 1996. In mid-2009, FHA announced its own version of the HAMP program (FHA-HAMP). FHA-HAMP offered a formula for modifying a loan to achieve an affordable payment. However, the original design for FHA-HAMP
was so flawed that it assured negligible participation. Borrowers who were more than 12 months in arrears were ineligible. Servicers routinely took more than 12 months to review a borrower for eligibility, leading inevitably to denials on timeliness grounds. In addition, FHA set debt-to-income ratio requirements that excluded many applicants. From the inception of FHA-HAMP in July 2009 through 2011, FHA servicers approved fewer than 12,000 FHA-HAMP modifications. At the end of 2011, there were 711,000 FHA loans in seriously delinquent status.

While servicers of other types of loans were implementing nearly one million HAMP modifications, FHA servicers continued to focus on non-modification options. These were typically short-term forbearance and repayment plans that did not provide sustainable solutions for unaffordable loans. The modifications that FHA servicers did approve were overwhelmingly FHA standard modifications. The FHA standard modification applied a cookie-cutter formula unrelated to affordability. While Treasury HAMP modifications were reducing borrower payments by over one-third, FHA standard modifications reduced payments on average by about 11%, a percentage unlikely to prevent re-default.

In early 2012, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined the performance of FHA loss mitigation compared to all other major loss mitigation programs, including those for conventional, GSE, and other government-insured loans. FHA came out worst in the comparison, behind all other industry players. When compared to all other categories of home loans, FHA loans had the highest post-modification re-default rates.

To its credit, FHA substantially revised its loss mitigation protocols during 2012-13. FHA came out with a new design for FHA-HAMP and an entirely revamped set of loss mitigation guidelines for evaluating borrowers. The new formulas permitted modifications with substantial payment reduction, allowing payments as low as 25% of the borrower’s income. The new FHA loss mitigation guidelines had the potential to benefit homeowners and the insurance fund in substantial ways. Unfortunately, the rules were complicated. Servicers needed robust oversight from HUD if they were going to implement the guidelines properly. At the same time, servicer delays had created a huge backlog of mortgages in default. Many of these loans had been in default for years with little attention from servicers. These were the circumstances under which HUD decided to ramp up its DASP program, a program that allowed servicers to shortcut state foreclosure procedures, terminate FHA insurance early, sidestep FHA loss mitigation reviews, and cut off homeowner access to all FHA options.

By rolling out DASP, FHA undermined implementation of its own improved loss mitigation program. At the time, hundreds of thousands of loans in default desperately needed reviews under FHA’s new guidelines. Instead, FHA offered servicers an option to receive immediate payment of insurance claims without sufficient oversight to ensure loss mitigation had been exhausted. Not surprisingly, the largest mortgage servicers, the ones who had caused and perpetuated the foreclosure delays, were quick to respond. Servicers, such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan Chase, chose most of the loans to be sold through DASP sales.

As the examples from the Philadelphia mediation program show, HUD has allowed DASP sales to proceed without effective oversight of servicers’ loss mitigation activities. Selling off an FHA loan when the default could have been cured and an insurance claim avoided clearly
harms the insurance fund. Without a meaningful analysis of the critical relation between loss mitigation and sound management of the insurance fund, HUD was not in a position to assess the real cost of DASP as an impediment to FHA’s loss mitigation program, and consequently as a drain on the insurance fund.

In its 2012 report on government agencies’ loss mitigation performance, the GAO repeatedly cited FHA’s long-standing failure to assess the beneficial impact of loss mitigation on protecting the insurance fund. Significantly, the GAO noted that HUD had not evaluated the cost-effectiveness of specific loss mitigation options in relation to particular loan and borrower characteristics, such as borrower income and loan-to-value ratio. Because of these deficiencies, the GAO found that FHA and HUD had “a limited understanding of the ultimate costs of their loss mitigation programs.” Without this understanding HUD could not appropriately balance the tradeoffs “between assisting borrowers to keep their homes and helping ensure the lowest cost to the taxpayer.” Comparing FHA’s assessments of its loss mitigation programs with those by the Treasury Department (for HAMP) and the GSEs, the GAO concluded that FHA lacked adequate data to evaluate the costs and benefits of loss mitigation as it pertained to both borrowers and taxpayers.

I. HUD’s Loan Sale Program During the 1990s Showed that HUD Can Set Standards for Distressed Loan Buyers

DASP was not HUD’s first program to involve sales of tens of thousands of single-family home mortgages. Until 1996, HUD operated a program under which HUD itself took assignments of defaulted FHA insured loans (“the HUD Assignment Program”). After taking ownership of the loans, HUD staff would oversee loss mitigation for them. In the early 1990s, HUD held 110,000 mortgages under the Assignment Program. From 1994 through 1997, as part of the phase-out of the Assignment Program, HUD auctioned off nearly 100,000 HUD-owned loans to private investors.

There were significant differences between the procedures HUD used for the 1990s loan sales and the structure it set up for DASP sales. Most significantly, in the 1990s HUD required that buyers continue to service the loans under the same guidelines that HUD staff were using while HUD owned the loans. The 1990s sales did not cut off the loss mitigation options that applied to the loans before the sales. In addition, after the sales HUD continued to monitor the new servicers directly to verify compliance with HUD’s servicing standards. HUD provided a complaint mechanism through which borrowers could notify HUD if a new servicer was not complying with HUD’s rules. HUD staff would be available to mediate between the borrower and the new servicer.

HUD now takes the position that a DASP sale cuts off the loan’s participation in the FHA program, including any obligation to follow FHA servicing guidelines. With the exception of the small portion of loans sold under “Neighborhood Stabilization” pools, HUD has not set clear, enforceable standards for loss mitigation once the loans are sold. Homeowners are not told...
in advance that their loans will be sold. Once the sale has taken place, homeowners have no effective recourse to HUD to correct abusive practices of the new servicers.

After the 1990s loan sales, HUD had a research firm evaluate the status of the loans sold under the program. According to the firm’s review of data two years after the sales, the new servicers resolved nearly all loan accounts within six months of purchase, and 61% of the loans were performing. This resolution rate contrasts starkly with the DASP program. For example, for the sale of 27,580 loans in large national pools conducted in June and September 2014 (SFLS 2014-2), HUD described about one-half as “unresolved” as of January 2016. Only 11.7% were considered performing.

HUD would not need to reinstitute the old assignment program in order to exercise effective control over buyers of distressed loans. HUD controlled buyers in the 1990s sales through the terms of auction bidder contracts. HUD could include enhanced provisions in the bidding agreements for future loan sales and develop appropriate enforcement mechanisms to make sure the purchasers complied with the terms.

The Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, have shown a greater willingness to include homeowner protections in the contract terms for sales of their non-performing loans. Beginning in 2015, Fannie Mae has required that buyers have the ability to review borrowers for HAMP modifications. In April 2016, the conservator for the GSEs announced three new requirements for purchasers of non-performing GSE loans. These included a requirement that purchasers review certain underwater loans for principal reduction modifications and implement these modifications if appropriate under a net present value test. The new GSE guidelines also limit the rate at which interest rates may be increased under post-sale modifications. Finally, the GSEs will bar loan purchasers from unilaterally releasing liens to abandon vacant properties. These new GSE requirements are narrow, and it remains to be seen how they will be enforced. HUD could certainly develop more rigorous standards based on its published guidelines for FHA servicers.

IV. ASSESSING DASP’S IMPACT ON HOMEOWNERS

A. The Evidence Does Not Show that DASP Helps Homeowners

When HUD announced the ramped-up loan sale program in mid-2012, it emphasized the potential benefits for homeowners. In June 2012, then-HUD Secretary Donovan described HUD’s plan to increase note sales tenfold as a “program to give more homeowners with seriously delinquent loans the chance to avoid foreclosure.” HUD took the position that while a loan remained insured by FHA the servicer could not reduce the principal balance as part of a modification. According to HUD, removing the obligation to comply with FHA rules would allow a new servicer to modify loans by reducing the principal balances owed. HUD’s view presumed that market incentives would drive the new servicers to exercise greater flexibility to accommodate borrowers. According to HUD, “[b]ecause the loans are generally sold for less than what the borrower currently owes, the purchaser has the ability to reduce or modify the loan terms while still making a return on the initial investment.” This would provide “the opportunity for the borrowers to potentially stay in their home under a new sustainable mortgage or other meaningful help.”
This did not materialize. There is little evidence that the private investors purchasing HUD loans are approving loss mitigation options with more favorable terms than would have been available under FHA’s guidelines. For-profit investors have purchased 98% of the loans sold under DASP.\textsuperscript{163} In reports about DASP, HUD has sought to describe the outcomes in a positive manner. However, the numbers do not support such a view.\textsuperscript{164} HUD’s reports rely on vague terminology and give little specific information about what actually happened to loans after DASP sales. For example, HUD’s report covering data for loan sales from 2010 to January 2016 indicated that 35.5% of 89,000 loans sold were still “Not Yet Resolved.”\textsuperscript{165} This meant that the servicer was still reporting the loan as in “delinquent servicing” – a final resolution of the default had not been reached.\textsuperscript{166} Loans sold through DASP were on average 29 months delinquent before the sales.\textsuperscript{167} If modifications with principal reduction had been a naturally attractive option, one would think that buyers would have acted quickly to put these modifications in place. The fact that such a large portion of these long-term delinquent loans remained in “black hole” status long after the note sales is troubling.

For the 65% of loans that HUD labeled as “resolved” after a DASP sale, the vagueness of reported outcomes raises similar concerns. HUD pointed out that for 43% of the “resolved” loans foreclosures were “avoided.”\textsuperscript{168} However, under the rubric of “foreclosure avoided” HUD included all instances where the borrower gave up the property through a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure or short sale. The category also included cases where the borrower paid off the loan or was merely in a short-term forbearance period.\textsuperscript{169}

As of January 2016, HUD reported about 16.8% of the “resolved” loans as “re-performing.”\textsuperscript{170} HUD further divided the “re-performing” resolved loans between those that were “re-performing with loan modification” (15.3% of resolved loans) and those that were “re-performing – other” (1.5% of resolved loans). The 16.8% figure for re-performing loans shrinks in the larger context. Roughly one-third the loans sold under DASP remained “unresolved.” In addition, HUD did not provide data on another 15% of the loans sold because DASP purchasers had already sold them to other buyers.\textsuperscript{171} Therefore, the 16.8% of “resolved” loans that HUD could identify as re-performing did not comprise more than about 10% of the loans sold under the program.

What was really going on with the 10% of DASP loans that were supposedly “re-performing?” HUD defined a “modification” as either a trial or permanent modification, but did not report anything about the structure of these agreements.\textsuperscript{172} We do not know whether HUD simply accepted servicers’ characterizations of certain resolutions as modifications even though they did not permanently change loan terms. The more specific examples discussed next call into question the loan buyers’ labeling practices. Nor do we know the extent to which the modifications targeted affordable payments based on the borrowers’ income. Most significantly, we do not know whether the modifications were better or worse than a modification the borrower could have received under FHA’s current guidelines if a DASP sale had not taken place.
HUD has the ability to collect useful and reliable data about loss mitigation outcomes after DASP sales. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, for example, publishes quarterly reports with detailed breakdowns of loan modification characteristics for millions of conventional mortgage loans.173 The Treasury Department has published monthly summaries of hundreds of thousands of modifications under the HAMP program, including details of how loan terms changed and how the changes affected affordability.174 As HUD was beginning the large-scale DASP sales in 2012, HUD declined to establish such requirements. HUD could easily have required the buyers to report this information on a regular basis. The data would show whether DASP sales actually do benefit homeowners by providing flexible, sustainable loss mitigation, as HUD had announced at the program’s inception.

The evidence of the actual loss mitigation offers that DASP buyers are giving borrowers substantiates the concerns raised about the program. The evidence does not support the theoretical analysis behind HUD’s pro-borrower spin. Some major servicers of DASP loans are presenting borrowers with options that include long-term payment plans that are labeled as loan modifications, but are not true modifications that permanently change loan terms. Other servicers for the buyers offer “trial modifications” coupled with vague offers to consider the borrower for a modification at some distant time in the future. The offers often do not refer to the terms of a permanent modification or to any established program for calculating the terms. Caliber, a servicer acting for one of the largest purchasers at DASP sales, offers five-year “interest only” payment plans. These plans lull borrowers with a teaser payment that will eventually convert to a level at least as high as the previously unaffordable payment and include a huge balloon payment due for all earlier unpaid amounts. Calling these types of offers “modifications” of the mortgage is deceptive. Still other servicers require substantial lump-sum payments as the initial step in any loan modification.

HUD’s reporting terminology puts a favorable gloss over many of these questionable practices. A homeowner making payments under one of these “modifications” has likely not been offered a long-term solution. These types of offers, combined with the trend of homeowners who have their loans sold before they have exhausted FHA loss mitigation, belie any claim that DASP tends to provide better solutions to homeowners. At the same time, DASP allows the new owners to bide their time, collect payments, re-sell the loans as “performing,” or foreclose whenever they choose.

HUD’s data regarding performance of loans after note sales must be viewed in the light of these practices. For example, Lone Star Funds purchased 16,686 loans from the national pools sold in Loan Sale Number 2014-2 (June, September 2014). Lone Star’s purchases represented 61% of the loans sold in that sale. HUD’s status report from January 2016 indicates that 50% of the loans from this sale were “resolved” and 20% of these resolved loans were “Re-Performing with Loan Modification.”175 We happen to know something about the terms of the offers that Lone Star has called “modifications.” During the latter part of 2014 and in early 2015, many homeowners received documents containing offers from Caliber Home Loans, Loan Star’s servicer. Caliber informed the homeowners: “Your request for a loan modification has been approved” and the mailing included a document captioned “Modification
Agreement – Limited Term.” Caliber’s standard agreement contained the following language:

**Summary of Modification:** We will reduce the balance on which interest is accruing and we may lower the interest rate for a period of time called the Reduction Period. During the Reduction Period you will make monthly “interest only” payments (plus escrow and Ancillary payments). Certain amounts are deferred, meaning that you still owe them, but they will be collected by the Servicer at a later date. On the Reduction Period End Date, your Loan and interest rate will revert to the terms of the operative loan documents and your payment may increase. Deferred amounts will remain deferred.177

It is hard to see how these terms create a loan modification. The agreement does not reduce the debt the homeowner must repay. Instead, it capitalizes arrearages to increase the interest-bearing principal. The agreement does not specify a maturity date for repayment, so it is not possible to tell whether there will be a balloon payment due at maturity and how large that balloon payment will be. Most importantly, the interest rate reverts back to the original loan terms when the reduction period ends. Because the principal balance has increased, the monthly payment for principal and interest will likely end up significantly higher than the pre-modification payment, the payment that led the homeowner into default. There is no long-term benefit to the borrower from these terms. The homeowner pays for five years and never reduces the debt. There is a benefit for Lone Star, however. The loan “performs” for five years and Lone Star can sell the loan at any time if it can make a profit off the deal.

Under current bidder agreements, purchasers of DASP loans must wait twelve months before they can foreclose. Before 2015, the waiting period was only six months. While the six-month period applied, servicers for DASP buyers were structuring modification agreements to last for six months. Two servicers of DASP loans, Selene Finance and Rushmore Loan Management, offered homeowners these six-month agreements, labeled trial modification plans, without providing details as to what the repayment terms would be after six months. Selene’s offer required that the homeowner make an initial payment of $10,000 to start off the trial plan, while Rushmore’s offer demanded a $6,000 initial payment. Under these agreements the servicer could allow the loan to “perform” for six months, but be under no obligation to keep the terms affordable thereafter. Bayview, the largest buyer of DASP loans, placed homeowners in particularly precarious modification agreements. Bayview’s form modification agreement provided that if the homeowner defaulted on a payment, the homeowner must give up the property immediately through a deed in lieu of foreclosure or short sale.179

**B. The Changes to DASP HUD Announced in 2015 Contain No Specific Resolutions to Long-Standing Problems with the Program**

In April 2015, HUD issued a press release announcing several technical changes to the DASP program. These changes were to be effective with an auction to be held later that year. One of the changes announced was that future purchasers of loans through DASP will be required to delay foreclosure for twelve months instead of six months after they acquire the mortgages. The extension may help borrowers in a few situations. However, investors with a legitimate interest in preserving the existing mortgages could easily have approved a modification or similar option within six months.
HUD also began requiring future buyers of loans through DASP to evaluate all borrowers for some form of HAMP modification. HUD never established any guidelines on what this “HAMP-like” modification should be or how it intends to enforce this requirement. The Treasury Department’s HAMP program is ending at the end of 2016 and there is no indication yet regarding what type of requirement will replace it. FHA’s version of HAMP (FHA-HAMP) works within a comprehensive “waterfall” protocol that guides the servicer in a review for a series of FHA loss mitigation options. HUD did not suggest that it is making the entire FHA loss mitigation program binding on DASP buyers. Over the past year, HUD has not provided a clear explanation of how it will enforce this unique FHA servicing option on non-FHA servicers. Similarly, it has not explained how it will require the private equity firms and hedge funds that buy the loans to honor this requirement when they re-sell the loans. Without transparent standards and a rigorous enforcement structure, asking servicers to modify loans has little value.

HUD also indicated that it was imposing more reporting requirements on buyers of DASP loans. HUD did not describe how detailed these reporting requirements will be or when they will be made public. Finally, HUD stated that it was enhancing pre-sale screening of loans entering into DASP pools. Here again, HUD did not release any details about this screening procedure. These changes do not go far enough to resolve the problems with the DASP program.

C. Most FHA Loans are Sold By the Servicers Who Caused Major Foreclosure Delays

HUD allows mortgage servicers to select the loans that it sells through DASP. In its reports HUD identifies the servicers that supplied most of the loans for the sales. HUD’s disclosures show that a few very large mortgage servicers supplied the majority of loans that passed through DASP.

Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of America were the three largest servicers of residential mortgages throughout the foreclosure crisis. They are also the largest servicers of FHA mortgages. Of the 101,254 loans that HUD sold up to August 2015, 67,059 came from these three servicers. DASP could be called “The Bank of America” loan sale program, as 44,501 DASP loans were sold in pools made up exclusively of Bank of America loans. Another 16,830 were sold in pools that consisted of Bank of America loans mixed with loans from another servicer, typically JP Morgan Chase.

Roughly two-thirds of the billions of dollars in FHA insurance claims paid out under DASP went to Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan Chase. Notably, these were three of the five servicers targeted by the 49 state attorney generals’ investigations during 2010-12. The involvement of these particular servicers goes a long way to explaining the extensive delays, averaging two and one-half years of delinquency, for the loans sold through DASP. It also explains the concentration of loans from judicial foreclosure states. These were the servicers most under scrutiny from courts and government agencies, a scrutiny that turned out to be well-founded.
D. Most DASP Purchasers are Private Equity Firms and Hedge Funds

The winners of DASP auctions have been almost exclusively large private equity firms and hedge funds. These are firms that specialize in buying up distressed assets. They may tinker marginally with the assets they buy, but their goal is eventually to sell them to someone else for a profit. The recycling periods may last two, three, or more years, but the firms’ ultimate objective remains to resell the assets for substantially more than they paid for them.

CHART 2

Top 10 Loan Buyers of FHA Defaulted DASP Loans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loan Buyer</th>
<th>Loans purchased</th>
<th>Total unpaid principal balance of loans purchased</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bayview Asset Management</td>
<td>22,068</td>
<td>$4,500,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lone Star Funds</td>
<td>17,066</td>
<td>$4,000,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selene Residential Partners</td>
<td>6,384</td>
<td>$3,500,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBS Financial Products, Inc.</td>
<td>5,485</td>
<td>$3,000,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCAT Depositor 2014-4, LLC</td>
<td>5,301</td>
<td>$2,500,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oaktree Capital Management/DC Residential</td>
<td>4,772</td>
<td>$2,000,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Capital Partners</td>
<td>4,235</td>
<td>$1,500,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondaur Capital Corporation</td>
<td>4,105</td>
<td>$1,000,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Corona Group</td>
<td>3,678</td>
<td>$500,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuberger Berman–PRMF</td>
<td>3,179</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RealtyTrac, February 2016.

Two private equity firms, Bayview Asset Management and Lone Star Funds, have bought the largest shares of DASP loans. Neither firm has a credible track record for building stable communities. The Blackstone Group owns the controlling interest in Bayview. Blackstone is the largest buyer of non-performing loans in the country, and the largest private equity firm generally. Blackstone is the leading funder behind the conversion of former single-family-owned homes into rental properties. This trend has spawned a new generation of mega-landlords that own small empires of single-family rental homes. As this trend develops, absentee landlords replace homeowners and former homeowners face higher housing costs as renters.

Lone Star Fund’s role as the major purchaser of DASP loans raises concerns as well. Lone Star services mortgages through its subsidiary, Caliber Home Loans. Caliber’s chairman and CEO, Joe Anderson, previously led Countrywide Mortgage’s marketing division. Countrywide was a prime driver of the bad lending practices that led to the foreclosure crisis. The third
largest DASP purchaser is Selene Residential Partners. Selene is a division of Ranieri Partners, whose Chairman and Founding Partner Lewis Ranieri was a key promoter of mortgage-backed securities during the subprime boom. Overall, the cast of characters buying the bulk of FHA loans has not demonstrated a commitment to distressed homeowners and neighborhoods.

HUD has not produced evidence that Bayview, Lone Star, and the other private equity firms purchasing DASP loans are agreeing to reduce principal balances as part of modifications on any regular basis. Overwhelmingly, the speculative buyers have not modified loans at all. They foreclose much more frequently than they modify loans. For example, for the second large DASP National Pool auction during 2013, the buyers reported that they had modified 9.1% of the loans while they foreclosed on 56.8% of them. In addition, many of the loans not foreclosed were disposed of through short sales or deeds in lieu of foreclosure rather than preserved through home retention options. As previously discussed, even the modifications offered are often not sustainable.

Arguably, some private equity firms and hedge funds have an interest in converting “non-performing” loans into “performing” loans. Performing loans can fetch more money upon resale than non-performing loans. However, to label a loan “performing” the firms do not have to modify it. They certainly do not have to reduce the principal balance. There are easier ways to designate a loan as “performing.” As described previously, when Caliber offers a “loan modification,” it is routinely a five-year interest-only payment plan. The agreement does not permanently restructure the loan terms, as occurs when a loan is modified. Instead, the borrower remains liable for the full loan balance and faces reversion to the old loan terms – to the payment obligation that the borrower could not afford before the DASP sale. These steps may help Caliber and Lone Star maximize the amount of money they make when they sell the loan (or the empty house) in a few years to someone else, but they do not help the borrower remain a homeowner for the long term.

Financial speculators are the primary source of funds for bailing out the insurance fund through DASP sales because they are willing and able to pay the most money for the loans. Lone Star describes its investment approach as to capitalize on market conditions in which “[f]inancial institutions’ balance sheets are under pressure and there is a need to dispose of high volumes of assets to manage capital, deleverage and build liquidity.” This accurately described HUD’s position with respect to the FHA insurance fund in 2012. Private equity firms could appear to be natural partners for institutions in HUD’s position at the time. The equity firms borrow heavily from pension funds, wealthy investors, and other public and private institutions. They securitize the income flows from their holdings, attracting capital at advantageous rates. With their access to these resources the large speculative investors can pay higher prices and squeeze out smaller community-focused bidders.

Taking the fire sale approach and welcoming high-paying financial speculators might be an acceptable alternative if HUD’s only obligation under federal law was to manage an insurance fund. Congress, however, directed HUD to fulfill another purpose as well. This was to preserve homeownership for families who would otherwise not have this opportunity.

Taking the fire sale approach and welcoming high-paying financial speculators might be an acceptable alternative if HUD’s only obligation under federal law was to manage an insurance fund. Congress, however, directed HUD to fulfill another purpose as well. This was to preserve homeownership for families who would otherwise not have this opportunity.
to preserve homeownership for families who would otherwise not have this opportunity. This second purpose must always guide HUD’s exercise of discretion in implementing the FHA housing program.

The equity funds’ business model is focused on asset recycling. This model does not align with HUD’s obligation to preserve homeownership, as directed by Congress, whenever feasible. Speculative investors can easily maximize payouts from distressed loans without doing the work of formally modifying the loans.

The incentives of the servicers who manage loans on behalf of DASP investors are similarly not aligned with the goal of homeownership. Mortgage servicers get paid based on the terms of their contracts with the investors who own the loans. These compensation structures often discourage modifications. Thus, servicers’ own financial incentives often lead them to foreclose rather than modify mortgage loans.¹⁹⁴

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

HUD must not conduct further loan sales unless and until it has put in place a strong and effective system for enforcement of its loss mitigation requirements and consistent, fair post-sale requirements that promote homeownership. We recommend the following:

1. Enhance loss mitigation compliance.
   - Require servicers to document and certify compliance with each step of FHA’s sequential loss mitigation review, including documentation of the grounds for denial of foreclosure alternatives, before HUD pays a claim. FHA-insured loans are routinely processed through foreclosure by mortgage servicers who fail to comply with FHA loss mitigation guidelines. DASP currently rewards those servicers and loan owners by paying off their claims early, saving them the time and expense of completing foreclosures in compliance with FHA rules. Yet, FHA guidelines are tailored to promote homeownership even in the face of hardship, providing a flexible menu of options geared to low and moderate income homeowners. While current oversight measures primarily rely on self-certification by servicers, a system in which servicers would be required to document the steps taken to follow FHA rules would enhance compliance and improve outcomes. The simple act of requiring documentation and certification is likely to increase up-front compliance more than any back-end supervision program.

   - Create a review and appeal procedure for loss mitigation decisions using neutral decision makers. The National Servicing Center now receives homeowner complaints but generally does not provide a de novo review of a servicer’s response to a homeowner’s request for loss mitigation. The NSC should offer appeals from FHA servicer denials or reviews of FHA loss mitigation problems that engage in fact-finding and require the servicer to follow procedures where the servicer has not adhered to requirements. Homeowners routinely face servicer non-compliance and generally have little recourse without seeking legal assistance. Such a procedure ideally would be implemented by a new neutral hearing–officer structure, although it could be established within the current structure.
• **Impose penalties on servicers who delay processing loss mitigation requests or systematically circumvent FHA loss mitigation requirements.** Delays in processing loss mitigation requests undermine home retention and impose significant costs on the FHA insurance fund by increasing the chances of foreclosure and inflating amounts due under a loan. HUD must use its statutory authority to impose penalties on repeat players who abuse the system, harm homeownership, and undermine FHA’s program goals.

• **Require servicers to provide notice to homeowners.** Such notice would accurately inform homeowners about the sale process, servicer obligations before and after sales, and homeowners’ rights under these note sale transactions, including the status and results of any loss mitigation outreach and review. The notice should be provided prior to the inclusion of a loan in a DASP pool and provide a homeowner with adequate opportunity to finish the loss mitigation process if it is still underway. Notice is needed because homeowners are routinely learning that their loans were sold while they are still seeking to complete the loss mitigation review process. Moreover, homeowners generally are unaware of the sales and the effect they have on homeowner rights.

• **Develop transparent and fair guidelines for determining which defaulted loans are sold.** HUD should develop objective guidelines for determination of which defaulted loans are sold. These guidelines should ensure that servicers are not using the process to avoid compliance with more protective state foreclosure laws.

• **Promote compliance with state and local laws, including mediation requirements.** State and municipal mediation programs create a forum for engagement between servicers and homeowners facing hardship and produce better home retention results. As a result, mediation programs support better compliance with FHA loss mitigation guidelines. HUD should include in its oversight measures to ensure and promote compliance with mediation programs.

2. **Improve buyer oversight.**

• **Implement a detailed loss mitigation protocol that provides top-tier loss mitigation protections to homeowners.** The GSEs have required purchasers at its non-performing note sales to apply some basic standards in reviewing borrowers for loss mitigation. In 2015, Fannie Mae began to require that buyers contract with HAMP servicers and provide HAMP reviews for all homeowners whose loans have been subject to a note sale. In April 2016, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) set some minimal requirements for consideration of principal reduction and restricted interest rate hikes in post-sale modifications. HUD’s requirements are less specific and therefore less protective. As a minimum standard, HUD should require actual FHA-HAMP reviews, rather than settling for “substantially similar” offerings. Proprietary modifications generally are not as affordable for homeowners and do not provide the same level of long-term performance. Because HAMP modifications, including FHA-HAMP, are offered within the context of a larger loss mitigation protocol, HUD should require evaluations for FHA-HAMP within a comprehensive set of loss mitigation options. These options should be at least as supportive of sustained homeownership as FHA’s current loss mitigation guidelines. The options should include review for principal reduction because that is the major benefit for homeowners HUD announced in launching the loan sale program.
• **Require that purchasers of distressed loans disclose their loss mitigation protocols.** As long as loans are FHA-insured, a set of defined, publicly available loss mitigation guidelines apply to them. Homeowners and housing counselors can look at these rules and know what the available options are. This transparency evaporates when servicers for buyers of FHA loans take over. The new servicers act arbitrarily. To the extent that they follow any system, their protocols are secret. These servicers sometimes deny that they offer any form of loss mitigation at all. Attorneys for homeowners have had to pursue litigation aggressively just to get the servicers to disclose what options they offer. HUD should require a transparent disclosure of available loss mitigation options as an essential element of the contracts to bid at distressed loan auctions. These protocols should be disclosed to the public as well as to HUD.

• **Implement an effective system for homeowner appeals of servicer loss mitigation decisions.** As previously described in connection with the need to enhance loss mitigation oversight generally, the National Servicing Center (NSC) currently takes borrower complaints and often works with the borrower and servicer to solve loss mitigation problems. We have suggested ways in which the NSC’s role can be strengthened. Homeowners facing problems with loss mitigation after loan sales need access to the same type of effective dispute resolution process.

• **Establish an effective system of monitoring and enforcing loss mitigation requirements for new owners and servicers.** Servicers and new loan owners should be required to document compliance with post-sale requirements for a time certain following a note sale. Although HUD has begun to set some minimal requirements for loan buyers, such as the review for a modification similar to a HAMP modification, HUD has not disclosed what the consequences will be if the buyer ignores the requirement. Nor has HUD disclosed what remedies it will provide for homeowners harmed by the buyer’s non-compliance. HUD needs to articulate clear consequences, enforce them, and ensure that homeowners are made whole if a buyer or its assignee ignores HUD requirements.

• **Bar from future auctions buyers who have purchased FHA loans in the past but systemically violated loss mitigation standards and other program requirements.** Investors with a record of violating post-sale FHA requirements should not be able to continue to profit from the sales without complying with rules intended to ensure that the program meets its goals.

• **Require reporting for post-sale loss mitigation activities, including data to show the levels and nature of payment changes, and old and new borrower debt-to-income ratios.** HUD’s rationale for the note sale program in part is the potential for better outcomes for homeowners. It is essential to better track the sustainability of outcomes.

• **Mandate post-sale reporting of demographic and geographic data about homeowners, loss mitigation, and loan performance.** The foreclosure crisis hit hardest in communities of color. It is crucial to ensure that sales and outcomes are monitored so that policies are implemented fairly and without disparate impact.

• **Report data on subsequent sales and rentals involving the properties.** Any assessment of the utility of the DASP sales, especially in light of the loss of access to FHA loss mitigation options, must be evaluated in light of the ultimate disposition of the properties involved.
- Establish a clear rule that post-sale reporting requirements are binding on subsequent buyers of the loans. Investors should not be able to “launder” the notes by selling them again. The importance of post-sale measures is not diminished simply because a loan has been sold again.

- Assess meaningful financial penalties for substantial noncompliance with reporting requirements and bidding contract terms. Oversight of the DASP sales only can be done well where there is adequate information about the sale outcomes and adherence to program guidelines. The availability of penalties for substantial problems with reporting or contract compliance will improve investor performance post-sale. Because bidding contract terms include loss mitigation requirements, where applicable, enforcement of such rules is an essential part of enhancing sustainable outcomes.

- Direct the immediate public release of all post-sale management reports and supporting documentation. HUD has developed reporting standards for DASP buyers. The public should know what HUD asks in these reports and how frequently buyers must submit them. So far, the public does not have access to HUD’s post-sale reviews. These provide essential insights into the agency’s stewardship of its mission and the efficacy of the DASP sales as a tool for meeting our national housing goals. These reports and related documentation must be made available to ensure public accountability and transparency for the program.

- Establish procedures to promote participation by non-profits and mission-driven entities. Auctions should be set up to facilitate participation by non-profits and other mission-driven entities by creating some smaller loan sale pools and allowing direct sales of individual defaulted loans to non-profits and government entities. These organizations share HUD’s mission of sustainable homeownership and can promote better DASP outcomes. As an additional protection for communities facing blight, HUD should bar loan purchasers and their assigns from releasing liens on vacant properties and walking away from them. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) announced a similar requirement for GSE non-performing loan sales in April 2016.

VI. CONCLUSION

HUD’s heavy reliance on note sales to cut losses from the insurance fund, minimizing more basic measures such as enforcing loss mitigation requirements, detracts from the achievement of important national housing goals. The American homeownership rate is at a 20-year low. The ongoing erosion of homeownership from low-income families is likely to be of long duration, and for some families will be permanent. Low- and moderate-income communities have been substantially altered by mass foreclosures. In recent decades, FHA loans have been the primary means for African-American and Hispanic families to achieve homeownership. The unnecessary loss of FHA homeownership forces these households into the rental market. As rents around the country rise, the families
pay increasingly high percentages of their income for housing, often 50% or more,197 while losing out on accruing wealth through homeownership. Instead of being pillars of stable communities, former homeowners must flee to wherever they can temporarily afford the rent. In a substantial number of cases, these outcomes are avoidable.

Vigorous enforcement of HUD’s loss mitigation rules would preserve homeownership and stabilize communities better than essentially unrestricted sales of the loans, often to financial speculators. To date, however, HUD has not held its major servicers accountable for their non-compliance with HUD’s own servicing rules. In the end, the mortgage servicers who caused the crisis for the FHA insurance fund walk away the winners. HUD pays the servicers’ inflated claims and the servicers often evade state laws meant to promote sustainable homeownership. The note sale program should continue only if it can be transformed to benefit homeowners, communities, and the Fund while preventing FHA servicers from escaping their obligations under FHA’s rules and avoiding accountability under state law for their conduct.
ENDNOTES

1. 42 U.S.C. 1441.
6. FHA Status of the Mutual Ins. Fund FY 2015 p.6
8. 12 USC 1708(a)(7).
10. Id. p. 21
14. 24 C.F.R. § 203.605(a); 24 C.F.R. § 203.606.
17. 24 C.F.R. § 203.605.
20. Legislation enacted as part of HUD’s 1999 appropriations authorized HUD to make advance payment of FHA insurance claims to lenders in connection with future loan sales. 12 U.S.C. § 1710(a)(1)(A). The legislation authorizes HUD to pay the claims upon assignment of the mortgage from the lender when at least three full monthly installments are due on the loan.

27. Id.


29. Id.

30. For example, HUD requires that its servicers give borrowers a form of notice at a fixed time after a default. 24 C.F.R. § 203.602.


32. Id. at 9.

33. Id.

34. Id. at 9–10.

35. Id. at 12.

36. Id. at 13–14.

37. Id. at 15.


44. Lorenzo Morrison is unrelated to Paulette Morrison, the New York homeowner described in the previous example.


46. 24 C.F.R. §§ 203.35(a)(10), 203.35(c), 203.605(c), 203.500.

47. 24 C.F.R. § 203.356(b).

48. The schedules are published in HUD Mortgagee Letter (“MLs”) and were revised in 1990, 2001, 2005, 2013, and 2015. See ML 90-4 (August 14, 1990); ML 2001-19 (August 24, 2001); ML 2005-30 (July 12, 2005); ML 2013-38 (October 28, 2013). In HUD Mortgagee Letter 2016-03 (Feb. 5, 2016) (effective Jan. 1, 2016) HUD substantially increased the foreclosure time frames that had been in effect for several decades. Few, if any, of the newly extended time frames reflect changes in state laws.

49. ML 2016-03 (Feb. 5, 2016) p. 2.


52. See e.g. Homeward Residential Inc. v. Gregor, 122 A. 3d 947, 952 (Maine 2015) (responding to servicer’s argument that state foreclosure laws had become too complicated to follow: “[t]he law, the rules of evidence, and court processes have not become more complicated in these matters. Applying established law, however, has become more problematic as courts address the problems...
the financial industry has created for itself”). The state laws that servicers found challenging often addressed authority to foreclose. These state laws uphold standards of transparency for records of ownership of property and basic contract rights. See Deutsche Bank v. Johnston, — P.3d. – 2016 WL 852521 * 8-9 (N.M. Mar. 3, 2016) (the rules for strict compliance for standing to foreclose are “vital because the securitization of mortgages has given rise to a pervasive failure among mortgage holders to comply with the technical requirements underlying the transfer of promissory notes, and more generally the recording of interests in property.”); U.S. Bank N.A. v. Ibanez, 941 N.E. 2d 40, 55 (Mass. 2011) (“what is surprising about these cases is not the statement of principles articulated by the court regarding title law and the law of foreclosure in Massachusetts, but rather the utter carelessness with which the plaintiff banks documented the titles to their assets.” (Cordy, J. concurring).

54. 24 C.F.R. §§ 203.35(a)(10), 203.35(c), 203.605(c), 203.500.
55. U.S. Dept. of HUD, Report to the Commissioner on Post-Sale Reporting FHA Single Family Loan Sale Program (January 22, 2016) p. 4
56. ML 2013-38. The states were Florida, Iowa, Maine, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont.
57. 24 C.F.R. §203.602.
58. 24 C.F.R. § 203.604.
59. 24 C.F.R. §203.605.
60. 24 C.F.R. § 203.606.
64. The New York courts issued a rule requiring that attorneys who filed foreclosure cases to certify that they had taken reasonable steps to verify the accuracy of documents they filed in courts. Servicers’ attorneys had to file this certification whenever they requested court action to move a case toward a foreclosure sale. State of New York Unified Court System, The 2012 Report of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, p. 2 https://www.nycourts.gov/publications/pdfs/2012ReportOfChiefAdministratorOfTheCourts.pdf
65. New Jersey Administrative Order No. 01-2010 (Jan. 31, 2011) N.J. Court Rule 4:64-1(a) (2), 4:64-2(d). Lender’s attorney must attach to complaint a certification that the attorney communicated with the appropriate employee of the entity claiming the right to foreclose. These employees must have personally reviewed the relevant documents and certifying attorneys must provide the names of and state the job responsibility of the employees with whom they communicated. The implementation of the rule coincided with long-term investigations by the state courts into the foreclosure practices of mortgage servicers. New Jersey Courts Press Release Dec. 20, 2010. http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/superior/press_release.htm

70. Id.
71. RealtyTrac, Exclusive Report Quarter 1 2013 Foreclosure Inventory Update p. 1
75. Id.
76. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
82. RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity on Slow Burn (Oct. 11, 2011) listing the ten states with the longest foreclosure time frames as: New York (986 days), New Jersey (974 days).
84. Fannie Mae Announcement SVC-2011-15 (September 1, 2011) directs all new foreclosures in Hawaii to be judicial and stop all non-judicial foreclosures.
88. The National Mortgage Settlement concluded the investigation commenced in 2010 by the attorneys generals of 49 states and various federal agencies, including the Department of Justice and HUD.
89. Id.
91. Id.

96. There were 8.7 to 8.8 million FHA-insured mortgages outstanding during the years 2010 – 2013. The seriously delinquent rate for these mortgages was 8.5% as of September 2010, 9% as of September 2011, 9.8% as of September 2012, and 8.2% as of September 2013. Seriously delinquent includes loans at least 90 days in default and in foreclosure or bankruptcy. U.S. Dept. of HUD, FHA Single Family Loan Performance Trends Credit Risk Management Reports, 2013-14; U.S. Dept. of HUD FHA Single-Family Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund Programs Quarterly Report to Congress, 2011-2014; U.S. Dept. of HUD Annual Report to Congress Regarding the Financial Status of the FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, fiscal years 2010-2014. According to these sources, the number of loans first becoming seriously delinquent held to a steady rate during 2009, 2010, and 2011, with about 500,000 new serious delinquencies occurring each year. The annual totals for new delinquencies dropped slightly during 2012 (to about 460,000) and remained well over 400,000 in 2013.


99. Id.
100. Since 2008, conference and mediation programs appeared in over twenty states. These programs were created under state statutes or court rules. The programs are described in National Consumer Law Center, Rebuilding America How States Can Save Millions of Homes Through Foreclosure Mediation (Feb. 2012) available at https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/report-foreclosure-mediation.pdf


103. Id.
104. Id at p. 37.


106. Id.


108. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Develop., FHA Single-Family Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund Programs Quarterly Report to Congress FY 2012 Q1 (Mar. 26, 2012) p. 8, 12 (“We anticipate the recent settlement will accelerate foreclosure activity, perhaps within the next two quarters. . . . It is possible that the recent settlement may spark a breaking of the foreclosure back-log that has been affecting the entire mortgage industry since the start of FY 2011.”).


114. Id.
115. Id. p. 12.
117. Id. at pp. 24-26.
119. Id.
120. Id. at pp. 52-53.
122. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
130. Id. p. 52.
136. U.S. Dept. of HUD. , FHA Single-Family Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund Programs Quarterly Report to Congress FY 2015 Q4 (Dec. 2, 2015) p. 23. HUD’s losses on post-foreclosure REO sales were 71.7% of the unpaid balance on loans in 2011. In 2105 the average losses were 56.65 percent of the unpaid balances.
138. Id.
143. HUD Mortgagee Letter 2009-23 (July 30, 2009).
146. Id. at p. 10
152. Id. pp. 61-62.
153. Id.
154. Id. p. 70.
156. In April 2015, HUD announced that it was going to require buyers of loans at future DASP sales to review borrowers for a “HAMP-like” modification. To date, HUD has not released any details about what this vague term means. HUD has not disclosed any mechanism for enforcing such a standard. See HUD Press Room: “HUD Announces Changes to Distressed Asset Stabilization Program” Press Release April 24, 2015.
158. U.S. Dept. of HUD Report to the Commissioner on Post-Sale Reporting FHA Single Family Loan Sale Program (January 22, 2016) p. 44 (HUD did not include status data for approximately 10% of the loans from this sale that DASP purchasers had already sold to new buyers).
159. Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA’s Analysis of a Principal Reduction Modification Program and Enhanced Non-Performing Loan Sales Requirements (April 14, 2016) at http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-PRM-Program-and-Further-Enhancements-to-NPL-Sales-Reqts.aspx
162. Id.

165. U.S. Dept. of HUD Federal Housing Admin. *Report to the Commissioner on Post-Sale Reporting FHA Single Family Loan Sale Program* (January 22, 2016) p. 11. An additional 15,000 loans had been sold by DASP buyers to new owners. HUD did not report information on the status of these loans. *Id.* p. 54.

166. *Id.* p. 4.

167. *Id.* p. 11.

168. *Id.* p. 54.

169. *Id.*

170. *Id.*

171. *Id.* p. 9.

172. *Id.* p. 11.


175. U.S. Dept. of HUD, *Report to the Commissioner on Post-Sale Reporting FHA Single Family Loan Sale Program*, data as of January 22, 2016, p. 44. The same entry indicates that of the total of 27,580 loans sold in this sale approximately 3,000 had already been transferred by the initial buyers. HUD did not provide any data about the status of these loans.


177. *Id.* ¶ 3.

178. Selene Finance Trial Modification Plan; Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC Trial Modification Agreement, both at http://www.nclc.org/issues/opportunity-denied.html.


182. HUD’s Neighborhood Watch site gives detailed breakdowns of servicer portfolio size for FHA loans. https://entp.hud.gov/sfnw/public/. As of early 2016, the largest FHA services were: Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, U.S. Bank, and Bank of America. Bank of America ranked higher in past years, but recently sold off significant portions of its FHA portfolio, as described in this Report.


190. Matthew Goldstein, New York Times Sept. 28, 2015, “As Banks Retreat, Private Equity Rushes to Buy Troubled Home Mortgages.” (“In the first half of 2015, Fitch ratings said of the loans it had reviewed Caliber had not completed any modifications that included permanent principal reductions.”)

191. U.S. Dept. of HUD Report to the Commissioner on Post-Sale Reporting FHA Single Family Loan Sale Program (January 22, 2016) p. 34 (describing SFLS 2013-2 National Pools Sale June 26, 2013 consisting of 13,149 loans. These figures pertain to the 79% of the loans that the new servicers reported as “resolved” since the June 2013 DASP sale date.

192. Id.


197. The State of the Nation’s Housing 2015 Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard Univ. (2015) p. 5 “In 2013, almost half of all renters had housing cost burdens, including more than a quarter with severe burdens (paying more than 50 percent of income for housing).”